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I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
An evaluation of the verdict in this case reveals violations of
the defendants‟ human rights protected under Articles 3, 6, and 7
of the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, other
Convention rights also may have been violated. The materials
provided for use in this report, and the time allotted to complete it,
were not sufficient to undertake a thorough analysis of these other
issues. Sacrificing breadth for depth, and in keeping with the
request of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for
Civil Society and Human Rights, this report examines selected
violations of the Convention that are most clearly identifiable in
the verdict itself and in the conduct of the trial described in it.
The conclusions of this report are as follows:
1) The defendants‟ detention in the courtroom and the
conditions of their confinement on remand during
the trial court proceedings constituted inhuman or
degrading treatment (Article 3).
2) The proceedings exceeded a reasonable time
(Article 6).
3) The tribunal lacked independence and impartiality
(Article 6).
4) The verdict lacked indicia of a reasoned judgment
(Article 6).
5) The defendants were deprived of the presumption of
innocence (Article 6).
6) The defendants were deprived of their right to
equality of arms (Article 6).
7) The charge of embezzlement lacked foreseeability
(Article 7).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977855
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II. REPORT BACKGROUND
On 1 April 2011, an invitation was received via e-mail from the
Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for Civil Society
and Human Rights “to participate in an independent public expert
analysis of official documents and proceedings in the recent
criminal case concerning M.B. Khodorkovsky and P.L. Lebedev,
who were convicted by a judgment announced on December 27,
2010.” The invitation stated that “[t]he Council hopes to obtain
from you a written opinion with a focus on issues within your
area(s) of expertise, although you would also be free to express
your opinion on any other legal question which you believe to be
pertinent within judicial practice in connection with the case at
hand.” A response was requested by 30 April 2011.
On 30 April 2011, the invitation of the Council was accepted
via e-mail reply. In the letter of acceptance, an indication was
made that the legal analysis of the report would concern the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights.
On 2 May 2011, the Council acknowledged via e-mail the
receipt of this reply. A copy of the verdict was sent as an
attachment to that e-mail and the website www.Khodorkovsky.ru
was recommended as a useful resource from which to obtain other
legal documents necessary for this expert report. A copy of the
expert report was requested by September.
On 1 October 2011, this report was submitted to the Council.
The report was submitted in English.
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III. READER’S NOTE
The European Court of Human Rights is not a court of appeal
in the final instance from the decisions of domestic courts. The
Court‟s jurisdiction “shall extend to all matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols
thereto which are referred to it[.]” See Article 32 ECHR. The
Court‟s function is to identify violations of the Convention and, if
necessary, to establish just satisfaction for them. The Court has
repeatedly observed that “it is not its function to deal with errors of
fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in
so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by
the Convention.” Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97
(12 May 2000), at ¶ 34 (internal citations omitted).
Given the diversity among member states party to the
Convention, the Court has also adopted a doctrine that provides a
margin of appreciation to national practices. This report takes no
position regarding Russian law other than to assess its conformity
to the requirements set forth by the Convention.
This report selectively identifies several violations of the
Convention. Under each heading, the report first sets forth the
relevant provisions of the Constitution and Code of Criminal
Procedure of the Russian Federation. Second, the relevant
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights are provided.
Finally, the report analyzes this law in light of the facts of the
defendants‟ case and concludes whether the Convention could be
said to have been violated. Not every potential violation has been
subject to the same degree of scrutiny or, in some cases, evaluated
at all. No judgment as to the merits of such claims is intended to
be conveyed by, and none should be ascribed to, these choices.
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IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Following various tax inspections that began in November
2002, the Tax Ministry of the Russian Federation concluded that
the Yukos oil company had avoided the payment of a variety of
taxes. The Ministry found that this tax avoidance had been
accomplished by the use of various subsidiary, trading, and
holding companies that, although controlled and owned by Yukos,
served to obscure Yukos‟s real business activity. The Ministry
also found that the trading companies served as intermediaries
between oil production companies and oil processing and storage
companies, all of which belonged to Yukos.
On 20 June 2003, the first criminal investigation was opened
concerning the Yukos oil company and its top management, who
were suspected of fraud during the 1994 privatization of Apatit, a
mining company. As the European Court summarized the matter:
In 2003-2004 the General Prosecutor‟s Office
opened an investigation into the activities of several
of the company‟s senior executives, including Mr
Khodorkovskiy, Mr Lebedev, … and others. Some
of them were arrested in 2003-2004 on suspicion of
having
committed
large-scale
fraud
and
1

These facts are drawn primarily from the verdict of 27 December 2010 by
Judge V.N. Danilkin, presiding judge of the Khamovnichesky District Court of
the City of Moscow; the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
arising out of applications by Mikhail Khodorkovsky (App. No. 5829/04
decided 31 May 2011), Platon Lebedev (App. No. 4493/04 decided 25 October
2007), Vasilii Aleksanyan (App. No. 46468/06 decided 8 December 2008), and
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos (App. No. 14902/04 decided 20 September
2011); and the admissibility decision of the European Court of Human Rights
arising out of the application by Platon Lebedev (App. No. 13772/05 declared
partly admissible 27 May 2010). Discrepancies between these sources and the
use of any other sources are noted.
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embezzlement of the shares of several Siberian oil
refineries, including Tomskneft PLC. In particular,
Ms S.B., one of the company‟s lawyers, was
arrested. According to the Government, in her
statement of 8 December 2004, confirmed in MarchApril 2006, she testified that the applicant, as her
manager, had instructed her in relation to the illegal
operations with the Tomskneft PLC shares, qualified
by the prosecution authorities as embezzlement.

Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 46468/06 (22 Dec. 2008), at ¶ 8.
On 2 July 2003, Platon Leonidovich Lebedev was arrested
while in hospital and sent to a pre-trial detention center. The next
day, he was remanded to a detention facility by court order made
without the participation of Lebedev‟s lawyers.
On 20 August 2003, the criminal investigation, which had been
initiated on 20 June 2003, ended. The case file contained 162
volumes.
On 25 October 2003, Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky was
arrested in Novosibirsk and sent to Moscow.
On 8 January 2004, a separate criminal investigation was
opened on suspicion of fraud, embezzlement, and misappropriation
by Yukos executives of the shares of several oil companies,
including Tomskneft.
On 15 April 2004, the Tax Ministry served Yukos with a tax
assessment. The Ministry found that Yukos had failed to pay
certain taxes and ordered payment of over €2.8 billion in tax
arrears, default interest, and penalty payments. The order gave
Yukos until 16 April 2004 to pay this amount. However, by a
decision of the Moscow City Commercial Court rendered on the
same day that Yukos was served with a copy of the Tax Ministry‟s
decision, judicial proceedings were begun against Yukos to obtain
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this amount and the company was enjoined from disposing of
certain assets in anticipation of a judgment by the court.
On 16 July 2004, the defendants‟ trial began in the
Meshchanskiy District Court of the City of Moscow. On 16 May
20052, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were convicted of fraud
(Article 147 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and Article 159 of the
RF Criminal Code), causing property damage by deceit or breach
of trust (Article 165 CC RF), and tax evasion (Article 198 and
Article 199 CC RF) by a verdict of the Meshchanskiy District
Court. They were sentenced to nine years in prison.
On 22 September 2005, the verdict was upheld on cassational
appeal but the sentences were reduced to eight years in prison.
On 29 March 2006, prosecutors sought authorization from the
Simonovskiy District Court in the City of Moscow to initiate the
prosecution of Vasilii Aleksanyan, then head of the legal
department of the Yukos oil company. According to the
description found in the judgment of his application by the
European Court of Human Rights:
On 29 March 2006 the Deputy Prosecutor General
requested the Simonovskiy District Court of
Moscow to authorise criminal prosecution of the
applicant in connection with his alleged
participation in the embezzlement of the property
and shares of several oil companies and refineries in
1998-1999 (Tomskneft, Achinsk refinery, Eastern
Oil Company, etc). The GPO [General Procurator‟s
Office] claimed that in 1998-1999, when the
applicant had been the head of the legal department
2

In Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31 May 2011) at ¶ 69, the
European Court of Human Rights dates this conviction as 31 May 2005.
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of Yukos, he had advised the company‟s executives
and thus participated in their criminal activities. The
shares in these companies had subsequently been
“legalised” through a chain of financial operations.
In their request the GPO referred to the materials
from the criminal case, without, however,
identifying them.

Aleksanyan, supra at ¶ 15.
On 4 and 5 April 2006, the court authorized searches of
Aleksanyan‟s homes in connection with this request. On 6 April
2006, the court authorized the prosecution.
On 4 August 2006, the commercial court of Moscow declared
Yukos to be bankrupt and, with the consent of the leading creditor,
Rosneft, a state-owned oil company, appointed a trustee to manage
Yukos. This decision was upheld by the 9th Commercial Court of
Appeal on 26 September 2006.
On 12 December 2006, the criminal investigation, which had
been initiated on 8 January 2004, ended. The case file contained
113 volumes.
On 5 February 2007, a second indictment, alleging
embezzlement (Article 160 CC RF) and money-laundering
(Articles 174 and 174.1 CC RF) by the defendants, was
announced.3 The final version of the indictment lodged with the
court and dated 14 February 2009 comprises fourteen volumes
(3460 pages). The crimes alleged in the indictment span roughly
3

See e.g. BBC News, New fraud charges in Yukos case, 5 February 2007; RIANovosti, Security tightened as ex-Yukos head returns to court, 5 February 2007.
The indictment («обвинительное заключение») made available to the author of
this report is dated 14 February 2009. The discrepancy in date may reflect the
final version of the indictment filed with the court pursuant to Article 215 of the
Criminal Procedure Code.
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the same time period as the crimes for which the defendants were
arrested in 2003 and convicted in 2005. Both sets of crimes
concern the defendants‟ conduct as executives of the Yukos oil
company.
On 25 October 2007, the European Court of Human Rights
released its judgment concerning an application Lebedev filed
about his detention and access to a lawyer. The Court found that
Lebedev‟s detention, in various ways, violated Article 5 § 1(c), §
3, and § 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
On 12 November 2007, bankruptcy proceedings concerning
Yukos concluded, at which time it ceased to have corporate
existence.
At a hearing held on 22 January 2008, Aleksanyan, who had
been gravely ill with AIDS-related diseases, alleged that, on 28
December 2006, investigator Karimov, who was in charge of the
cases against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, had “offered him a deal:
if he testified against Mr Khodorkovskiy and Mr Lebedev he
would be released. Mr Karimov had allegedly told the applicant
that the General Prosecutor‟s Office had been aware of his health
situation, and that it would be advisable for the applicant to receive
appropriate treatment, perhaps in a foreign hospital.” Aleksanyan
further alleged that, in April 2007 and November 2008,
investigators had offered him release in return for his confession
and cooperation in these cases. Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No.
46468/06 (22 December 2008) at ¶ 86.4
4

According to Aleksanyan‟s submissions to the European Court, at a hearing
before the Russian Supreme Court on 22 January 2008, “which was widely
covered in the Russian media, the applicant disclosed that the prosecution had
made several offers of release on health grounds in exchange for false
testimony, confirming that his lawyer had been present and had witnessed those
incidents. Immediately thereafter the Federal Penitentiary Service threatened
the applicant‟s lawyer with a defamation suit, as the Government had moreover
acknowledged in their observations.” Id. at ¶ 227.
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On 22 December 2008, the European Court of Human Rights
released its unanimous judgment of an application Aleksanyan
filed concerning his detention and the search of his premises. The
Court held that there had been a violation of Article 3 due to
inadequate medical care while in detention, a violation of Article 5
§ 3 due to the unreasonable length of his detention, and a violation
of Article 8 due to the vagueness of warrants issued for, and
overbreadth of investigative searches conducted of, his premises.
The Court further held that the Russian Government had failed to
comply with interim measures that had been indicated by the Court
under Article 39 and held that Aleksanyan should be released from
detention.5 Following the Court‟s judgment, Aleksanyan was
released on bail. In June 2010, it was reported that the criminal
charges against him were dropped due to the expiry of the relevant
statute of limitations.6
The second trial of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev began on 31
March 2009.
A verdict was expected on 15 December 2010.7 Without
explanation, the announcement of the verdict was postponed on
that date until 27 December 2010.
5

Although the European Court found that Russia had failed to comply with
interim measures to protect Aleksanyan‟s health, in violation of Article 34 of the
Convention, the Court concluded that Aleksanyan had not presented sufficient
evidence to support his allegations about undue pressure “in connection with the
proceedings in Strasbourg,” Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 46468/06 (22
December 2008) at ¶ 233, and held that Aleksanyan‟s complaint that his
prosecution had been pursued for ulterior purposes (a violation of Article 18 of
the Convention) was admissible but unnecessary to examine separately from the
Court‟s findings of other violations. Id. at ¶¶ 219-220.
6
Alexandra Odynova, Charges Dropped Against Yukos’ Aleksanyan, Moscow
Times (25 June 2010).
7
See, e.g., Alexandra Odynova, Khodorkovsky Verdict is Postponed, Moscow
Times (16 Dec. 2010); CNN Wire Staff, Verdict in Khodorkovsky’s 2nd Trial
Postponed, CNN (15 Dec. 2010); RIA-Novosti, Announcement of Khodorkovsky
Verdict Postponed til Dec. 27 (15 Dec. 2010.
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On 16 December 2010, during a nationwide television
program, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin responded at length to a
question about Khodorkovsky by saying, inter alia, that “a thief
should sit in jail.”8
On 27 December 2010, the verdict was read out.
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were found guilty of embezzlement
and money laundering and sentenced to fourteen years
imprisonment.
On 15 April 2011, the judicial collegium for criminal cases of
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation released its
supervisory determination («определение суда надзорной
инстанции») concerning various rulings about the defendants‟
detention made by the Khamovnichesky District Court and the
Moscow City Court in 2010 and 2011.9 The Supreme Court
concluded that the defendants‟ custody in a pre-trial detention
facility (rather than in the less severe custodial conditions to which
they were previously sentenced) from 17 August to 17 November
2010 was unlawful.
On 17 May 2011, the Moscow City Court was scheduled to
hear the defendants‟ appeal from the verdict of the
Khamovnicheskiy court.10 Without explanation, the hearing was
postponed.

8

See infra at Section(B)(2)(c) of Part V of this report.
See Opredelenie ot 15.04.11. Sudebnaya kollegiya po ugolovnym delam,
kassatsiya (Dokladchik: Shamov Aleksei Viktorovich) (№ 5-Д11-29). This
determination was the result of a new law, No. 60-FZ from 7 April 2010, which
amended Article 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code to exclude those suspected
or accused of certain crimes (including those of which the defendants were
accused) from the harsher confinement conditions of pre-trial detention in the
absence of certain exceptional circumstances.
10
Thomas Grove, Khodorkovsky appeal set for May 17: Russian court, Reuters
(27 Apr. 2011); Tom Balmforth, Moscow Court Upholds Convictions Of
Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (24 May 2011).
9
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On 18 May 2011, President Dmitrii Medvedev responded to a
question about Khodorkovsky at a press conference in Skolkovo,
saying that there would be “no danger” to society if Khodorkovsky
were to be released from prison.11
On 24 May 2011, the defendants‟ appeal was heard and
decided. The Khamovnichesky court‟s verdict was upheld with a
modest reduction in the original sentence.
On 31 May 2011, the European Court of Human Rights
released its judgment of an application Khodorkovsky filed
concerning his arrest, detention, and first trial. The Court found
that Khodorkovsky‟s arrest violated Article 5 § 1 (b) of the
European Convention on Human Rights; that the conditions of his
detention in court and in a remand prison during his first trial
violated Article 3 of the Convention; that the length of his
continuous detention pending investigation and during that trial
violated Article 5 § 3 of the Convention; and that various
procedural irregularities concerning his detention resulted in
multiple violations of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Court
also found that Khodorkovsky‟s initial detention following his
arrest did not violate Articles 3 or 5 § 4, nor had there been any
violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention (which concerned
whether his detention pending investigation and trial “had been
imposed and extended in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law”).12

11

Press Conference of the President of Russia, 18 May 2011, “Skolkovo”
School of Management, http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/11259. See infra at
Section(B)(2)(c) of Part V of this report.
12
In addition, the Court also found that the procedure extending his detention on
8 June 2004 did not violate Article 5 § 4 (distinguishing that instance with
procedures that did violate that provision of the Convention on two prior
occasions and one subsequent occasion).
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On 13 September 2011, the judicial collegium for criminal
cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation released its
supervisory
determination
(«надзорное
определение»)
concerning various rulings about the defendants‟ detention made
by the Khamovnichesky District Court and the Moscow City Court
in 2010 and 2011.13 The Supreme Court concluded that the
defendants‟ custody in a pre-trial detention facility (rather than in
the less severe custodial conditions to which they were previously
sentenced) from 17 May to 17 August 2010 was unlawful.
On 20 September 2011, the European Court of Human Rights
released its judgment of an application filed by OAO Neftyanaya
Kompaniya Yukos concerning its treatment. In a judgment that is
not yet final, the Court held by majority votes that Yukos had not
been afforded adequate time to prepare for hearings concerning
certain tax assessments, in violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(b), and
that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention had been
violated both by the imposition of certain tax penalties and by the
disproportionate nature of the enforcement proceedings. The
Court also found that there had been no violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 of the Convention concerning other tax assessments
and no violation of Article 14 or Article 18 taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.14 The Court reserved to a later
date the issue of just satisfaction for these violations of the
Convention.

13

See Opredelenie ot 13.09.11. Sudebnaya kollegiya po ugolovnym delam,
kassatsiya (Dokladchik: Kamenev Nikolai Dmitrievich) (№ 5-Д11-63).
14
The Court also held that examination of the case under Articles 7 and 13 of
the Convention was not necessary.
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V. VIOLATIONS
A. ARTICLE 3
1. RELEVANT RUSSIAN LAW AND PRACTICE
The Constitution of the Russian Federation states, in relevant
part:
Article 21
1. The dignity of the individual shall be protected
by the state. Nothing may serve as a justification
for its diminution.
2. No one shall be subjected to torture, violence or
other cruel or degrading treatment or punishment.
No one may be subjected to medical, scientific or
other experiments without his free consent.
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
the Russian Federation are as follows:
Article 9
1. In the course of criminal proceedings, any action
or decision that demeans the honor of any
participant in criminal proceedings is prohibited, as
is any treatment of such person that lessens his
worth as a human being or endangers his life or
health.
2. No participant in criminal proceedings may be
subjected to violence, torture, or any other treatment
that is cruel or demeans human dignity.
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2. RELEVANT ECHR PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW
Article 3 of the Convention states:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.
The European Court has frequently characterized treatment “to
be both „inhuman‟ because it was premeditated, was applied for
hours at a stretch and caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least
intense physical and mental suffering, and also „degrading‟
because it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear,
anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them
and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.” Soering
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 (7 July 1989), at ¶ 100
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Court‟s case law concerning conditions of detention on
remand in Russia is extensive and need not be repeated here. It is
worth noting, however, that Russian violations of Article 3 have
been frequent and egregious.15 See, e.g., Kondratishko and others
v. Russia, App. No. 3937/03 (19 July 2011). In the year 2010
15

The second judgment against Russia concerned, inter alia, conditions of
detention. Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99 (15 July 2002). Russia
pled for a margin of appreciation due to economic difficulties alleged to hinder
prison reform. The Russian representative before the Court argued that
Kalashnikov‟s conditions of confinement could not amount to torture, inhuman,
or degrading treatment because they “did not differ from, or at least were no
worse than those of most detainees in Russia.” A Russian expert who appeared
in Strasbourg on behalf of the Russian Government in that case later
summarized this argument as a plea that “the conditions of confinement were
Russian.” See William Burnham & Jeffrey Kahn, Russia’s Criminal Procedure
Code Five Years Out, 33 Review of Central & E. Eur. Law 24 (2008). The
Court routinely rejects such arguments. See, e.g., Mamedova v. Russia, App.
No. 7064/05 (1 June 2006) at ¶ 63.
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alone, the Court found a violation of Article 3‟s right to be free of
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 102 judgments,
more than any other member state by a factor of three and
amounting to half of all violations found against Russia that year.
See Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, Annual
Report 2010 150-151 (2011).
a. Conditions of Detention on Remand
During the defendants‟ first trial, the defendants were held at a
remand facility informally known as Matrosskaya Tishina.
Lebedev was held in the main section, IZ-77/1, while
Khodorkovsky was held in IZ-99/1, a special-purpose block. For
two days in October 2003, and then again after the trial but before
departure to serve his sentence in a penal colony, Khodorkovsky
was confined in IZ-77/1.
The conditions at IZ-77/1, as well as the particular conditions
of confinement in an isolation cell and the deprivation of
opportunities for exercise and hot food due to his nearly daily
attendance at trial (but available to other detainees) were the
subject of Lebedev‟s second application to the European Court of
Human Rights. See Lebedev v. Russia (Lebedev No. 2), App. No.
13772/05 (27 May 2010), at ¶¶ 195-201. At the time of the writing
of this report, a judgment on the merits of this application, declared
admissible by a majority of the Court, had not occurred.
The conditions at IZ-99/1 were the subject, inter alia, of
Khodorkovsky‟s application to the European Court of Human
Rights. On 31 May 2011, the Court held that neither the detention
in October 2003 in IZ-77/1 (due to its brevity) nor detention in IZ99/1 during the trial (due to the ameliorative nature of food and
medicine received from relatives, frequent absence from the cells
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due to courtroom appearances, the use of fee-based extra services
such as a fitness facility, and other benefits not accorded the
general prison population) constituted a violation of Article 3.
However, the Court did find that the detention in IZ-77/1 for two
months after his conviction, when Khodorkovsky‟s treatment
returned to that provided by the standard prison regime, violated
Article 3. Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31 May
2011), at ¶ 117-118.
In making this assessment, the Court considered it appropriate
to shift the burden of proof to the Russian Government regarding
the conditions of Khodorkovsky‟s confinement. Id. at ¶ 108. This
decision was based on the consistency of Khodorkovsky‟s
submissions with those of a large number of petitioners to the
Court regarding these same facilities, the large number of
judgments against Russia in this regard, the practical difficulties
inherent in a prisoner collecting evidence about the conditions of
his detention, and the refusal of the authorities to allow
independent observers to visit Khodorkovsky during his
detention.16

16

The Court categorized the following judgments as presenting “very similar
complaints” as Khodorkovsky, mostly concerning IZ-77/1: Andreyevskiy v.
Russia, App. No. 1750/03 (29 Jan. 2009); Gubin v. Russia, App. No. 8217/04
(17 June 2010); Starokadomskiy v. Russia, App. No. 42239/02 (31 July 2008);
Popov v. Russia, App. No. 26853/04 (13 July 2006); Denisenko and
Bogdanchikov v. Russia, App. No. 3811/02 (12 Feb. 2009); Sudarkov v. Russia,
App. No. 3130/03 (10 July 2008); Belashev v. Russia, App. No. 28617/03 (4
Dec. 2008); Trepashkin v. Russia (No. 2), App. No. 14248/05 (Dec.), (22 Jan.
2009); Vlasov v. Russia, App. No. 78146/01, (12 June 2008) (concerning IZ99/1).
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b. Conditions in the Courtroom

Ordinarily, the measure of restraint adopted during trial for use
in the courtroom has not been considered under the heading of
Article 3 if it has been “imposed in connection with a lawful
detention and does not entail a use of force, or public exposure,
exceeding that which is reasonably considered necessary.”
Ramishvili & Kokhreidze v. Georgia, App. No. 1704/06 (27 Jan.
2009), at ¶ 96. “Even in the absence of publicity, a given treatment
may still be degrading if the victim could be humiliated in his or
her own eyes.” Id. Risk of flight and threat of violence are
countervailing factors that have been considered. Id.
During their first criminal trial, in the Meshchanskiy District
Court from 16 July 2004 to 16 May 2005, the defendants were
confined in a metal cage. It is, perhaps, enough to note that the
European Court found the conditions of Khodorkovsky‟s
confinement in the courtroom during this first trial to violate
Article 3 of the Convention. Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No.
5829/04 (31 May 2011), at ¶ 125-126. The Court noted that the
applicant‟s non-violent offense, lack of a criminal record, and lack
of evidence of any predisposition to violence made the
Government authorities‟ claim of security risks a specious one,
especially given that the cage appeared to be a permanent court
fixture unrelated to any specific concerns about the defendant. The
Court found that “such a harsh appearance of judicial proceedings
could lead an average observer to believe that an extremely
dangerous criminal was on trial. Furthermore, the Court agrees
with the applicant that such a form of public exposure humiliated
him in his own eyes, if not in those of the public, and aroused in
him feelings of inferiority.” Id. at ¶ 125.
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This confinement was also a subject included in Lebedev‟s
second application to the European Court of Human Rights. See
Lebedev v. Russia (Lebedev No. 2), App. No. 13772/05 (27 May
2010), at ¶¶ 179-183. As in Khodorkovsky‟s application to the
Court, the precise conditions were disputed. The Government
authorities submitted that the cage was an appropriate restraint
necessary to preserve courtroom order and safety and to prevent
the intimidation of witnesses. In any event, it did not rise to a level
of severity sufficient to implicate the protections of Article 3 of the
Convention. Lebedev submitted that he was confined for up to
nine hours a day without water or acceptable food, an unnecessary
humiliation for a non-violent defendant that also interfered with his
access to counsel. The concerns of the court could easily have
been alleviated by placing a guard next to him.
At the time of the writing of this report, the European Court of
Human Rights had not rendered a judgment on the merits of
Lebedev‟s application. On 27 May 2010, however, a majority of
the European Court declared the allegation of a violation of Article
3 admissible for a hearing on the merits. Given that the European
Court held that the same conditions in the courtroom described in
Khodorkovsky‟s application constituted a violation of Article 3, it
is likely that Lebedev‟s essentially identical application,
concerning the same trial conditions, will also be held to present a
violation of Article 3.
3. ANALYSIS
a. Conditions of Detention on Remand
During the trial, the defendants were again held at Matrosskaya
Tishina.
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Sufficient information about what improvements, if any, have
been made to conditions of detention at Matrosskaya Tishina
following the defendants‟ detention there during their first trial was
not available for the drafting of this report. Given the large
number of judgments against Russia regarding violations of Article
3 for conditions of detention – from the second judgment issued
against Russia (Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99 (15 July
2002)) to its most recent judgment (Ilyadi v. Russia, App. No.
6642/05 (5 May 2011) – another such judgment regarding the
defendants‟ conditions of detention is entirely possible.
b. Conditions in the Courtroom
During the second trial, press reports and photographs indicate
that the defendants were confined inside a glass compartment.17
Guards are seen in these photographs standing alongside the
compartment. On 3 March 2009, Khodorkovsky‟s attorneys filed a
motion with the Khamovnichesky Court requesting that
Khodorkovsky “be found alongside the lawyers, and not in an
aquarium.”
According to the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
Communications Center, the motion was denied the same day.18
It is difficult to say whether, under the factual circumstances of
this case, the Court will consider the use of a glass compartment to
be as degrading a form of treatment as the use of a metal cage. On
the one hand, a glass compartment may be considered to lack the
stigma of a cage. On the other hand, it remains a physical barrier
17

As noted below, the use of glass compartments to detain defendants during
trial has sometimes been analyzed by the European Court under the heading of
Article 6 of the Convention, concerning the presumption of innocence.
18
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Communications Center, Defense Files Two
Pleas,
3
March
2009,
http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/newsresources/stories/defense-files-two-pleas.
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between the defendant and all others. The European Court will ask
whether its use could have been “reasonably considered
necessary.”
Evaluation of the factors that the Court has considered in the
past suggests that its answer will be negative. The defendants were
not accused of crimes of violence. Although at the time of the trial
they had criminal records, these were not for violent offenses.
Given their incarcerated status and national media attention, they
were unlikely risks of flight. Indeed, Khodorkovsky had made
considerable show of his refusal to leave Russia when other
individuals suspected of the same crimes had fled.
B. ARTICLE 6 § 1
1. RIGHT TO PROCEEDINGS WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
a. Relevant Russian Law and Practice
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
the Russian Federation are as follows:
Article 6.119
1. Criminal proceedings are carried out in a
reasonable time.
2. Criminal proceedings are carried out in the time
periods established by this Code. Extension of these
19

This article was added to the Criminal Procedure Code by Federal Law of 30
April 2010 (No. 69-FZ). With regard to this amendment, as with all other
amendments to the Code identified in this report, Article 4 of the Code provides
that: “The law on criminal procedure in effect at the time of the performance of
an appropriate procedural action or the making of a procedural decision shall
apply in proceedings in a criminal case, unless otherwise provided by this Code.”
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time periods is permitted in cases and in the manner
foreseen by this Code, but criminal prosecution,
imposition of a sentence and termination of a
criminal prosecution should be carried out within a
reasonable time.
3. In determining a reasonable time period for
criminal proceedings, which includes the period
from the start of the criminal prosecution until the
termination of the criminal prosecution or
pronouncement of a judgment of conviction, such
factors as the legal and factual complexity of the
criminal case, the conduct of the participants of the
criminal proceedings, the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the actions of the court, the
prosecutor, the head of the investigative body,
investigator, head of the inquiry subdivision, the
inquiry agency, inquiry officer, which are
conducted to the ends of the timely accomplishment
of the criminal proceedings or examination of a
criminal case, as well as the total length of criminal
proceedings are taken into account.
4. The circumstances related to the organization of
the work of inquiry agencies, the investigation
agencies, the procurator‟s office and court, as well
as the examination of the criminal case by different
levels of authority may not be taken into account as
a basis for exceeding the reasonable time period for
the accomplishment of criminal proceedings.
5. If after submission of a criminal case to the
court, the case is not tried for a long period of time
and the judicial process is delayed, the interested
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parties have the right to recourse to the court
chairman with a motion on acceleration of the
examination of the case.
6. The motion on the acceleration of the
examination of a criminal case is considered by the
court chairman no later than 5 days from the day the
motion was filed with the court. As a result of the
examination of the motion, the court chairman
issues a reasoned decision, in which a period for the
conduct of a court‟s session on the case may be
established and (or) other procedural actions to
accelerate the examination of the case may be
accepted.
Article 121
A motion shall be heard and disposed of as soon as
possible after it is made. When a motion made in
the course of a preliminary investigation cannot be
disposed of immediately, it shall be decided no later
than three days after it was made.
Article 129 § 2
A time period may be extended only in situations
and in accordance with the procedures specified in
this Code.
Article 144 §§ 1 & 3
1. An inquiry officer, inquiry agency, investigator,
head of the investigating body must accept and
investigate every report of the commission of a
crime or of preparation to commit one, and shall
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make a decision on such report within the scope of
his duties as defined by this Code no later than 3
days after the filing of such a report. …
3. A head of the investigating body, head of an
investigative unit or head of an inquiry agency, on
the official, reasoned request of an investigator or
inquiry officer, may extend the time period
specified by part one of this Article up to 10 days.
When the production of documentary verification,
audits, research of documents, objects or bodies is
necessary, the head of the investigative body at the
request of the investigator or prosecutor at the
request of the investigator may extend this period to
30 days on concrete, factual circumstances giving
rise to such extension with a binding instruction.
Article 146 § 420
4. The order initiating the criminal case shall be
forwarded to a procurator without delay. … Upon

20

Paragraph 4 of this article was amended during the pendency of this case, see
Federal Law from 2 December 2008 (No. 226-FZ), which shifted authority to
initiate a criminal case from a prosecutor to the head of the relevant federal
investigative committee, a newly created body. The unamended version is
provided above because the case was initiated in February 2007, prior to the
coming into effect of this amendment. The amended version, in relevant part, is
as follows: “A copy of the order of the head of the investigating body,
investigator, or inquiry officer initiating the criminal case shall be forwarded to
a procurator without delay. … If a procurator recognizes an order initiating a
criminal case as unlawful or unfounded, he has the right within 24 hours from
the receipt of the materials serving as the basis for the criminal case to cancel
the order initiating the criminal case, about which he gives a reasoned decision,
a copy of which is provided without delay to the official who initiated the
criminal case. The head of the investigative body, the investigator, or the
inquiry officer shall without delay notify the complainant and the person against
whom a criminal case has been initiated about the decision.”
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receiving the order, the procurator shall give his
consent, without delay, to the initiation of a criminal
case or issue an order withholding consent for the
initiation of a criminal case or sending the materials
back for an additional verification, which must be
conducted within a period of no more than 5 days.
The investigator or inquiry officer shall notify the
complainant and the person against whom the
criminal case was initiated of the procurator‟s
decision on the same day.
Article 16221
1. A preliminary investigation in a criminal case
shall be completed within a time period not
exceeding two months after the criminal case is
initiated.
2. The preliminary investigation time period runs
from the date the criminal case is initiated until the
date it is forwarded to the procurator recommending
an indictment, the date it is ordered to be forwarded
to a court for consideration of whether to order
involuntary medical treatment, or the date when an
order dismissing proceedings in the criminal case is
issued.

21

Paragraph 7 of this article was amended once and paragraphs 4 and 5 were
amended twice during the pendency of this case, see Federal Laws from 5 June
2007 (No. 87-FZ) and 3 December 2007 (No. 323-FZ). With regard to
paragraph 4, the amendment reduces the permitted period of extension from six
to three months and requires the assent of the corresponding head of the
investigative body. With regard to paragraphs 5 and 7, the amendment shifts
authority from the procuracy to the (then) new Investigative Committee.
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3. The preliminary investigation time period shall
not include any time during which the preliminary
investigation was suspended on the grounds
specified by this Code.
4. The procurator of a district, the procurator of a
city, and equal-status military procurators and their
deputies, may extend the preliminary investigation
time limit up to 6 months.
5. In a criminal case in which the investigation is
especially complex, the time limit on the
preliminary investigation may be extended up to
twelve months by the procurator of a subject of the
Russian Federation, and equal-status military
procurators and their deputies.
Any further
extension of the preliminary investigation time limit
may be made only in exceptional cases and may be
effected solely by the Russian Federation Procurator
General or his deputies.
6. When a procurator returns a criminal case for a
supplementary investigation and also when a
suspended or dismissed criminal case is reopened,
the time period for such supplemental investigation,
which shall be set by the procurator, may not
exceed one month following the date such criminal
case was filed with the investigator. Any further
extensions of the preliminary investigation time
limit may be effected on the general grounds and in
accordance with the general procedures established
by this Article.
7. Whenever it becomes necessary to extend the
time limit on the preliminary investigation, the
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investigator shall issue an appropriate order to that
effect and submit it to the procurator no later than 5
days before the expiration of the preliminary
investigation time limit.
8. The investigator shall notify in writing the
accused and his defense counsel, as well as the
victim and his representative, of the extension of the
preliminary investigation time limit.
Article 217 § 1
After fulfilling the requirements of Article 216 of
this Code the investigator shall present bound and
numbered volumes of the criminal case file to the
accused and to his defense counsel …
Article 221 § 122
A procurator shall review the criminal case file with
an indictment that was forwarded by the
investigator and within 10 days shall make one of
the following decisions:
1) approving the indictment and forwarding the
criminal case to court. …
Article 227 §§ 1 & 3
1. When a criminal case is filed in court, the judge
shall make one of the following decisions: …
3) setting a trial date. …

22

This article was amended during the pendency of this case, see Federal Law
from 5 June 2007 (No. 87-FZ), which increased the time period above from 5
days to 10 days.
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3. The decision shall be made within 30 days after
the criminal case is filed with the court. …
Article 233 § 1
1. Trial of a criminal case in court shall commence
no later than 14 days after the order setting a trial
date is issued … .
Article 295 § 2
2. Before the court retires to the deliberation room,
trial participants shall be informed of the time when
the judgment is to be announced.
b. Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:
In the determination … of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time… .

In judgments dating back decades, “the Convention institutions
have consistently taken the view that Article 6 is, in criminal
matters, „designed to avoid that a person charged should remain
too long in a state of uncertainty about his fate‟[.]” Nakhmanovich
v. Russia, App. No. 55669/00 (2 March 2006) at ¶ 89 (citing
Stögmüller v. Austria, App. No. 1602/62 (10 November 1969) at
¶ 5). The European Court has held that the “the duty to administer
justice expeditiously [is] incumbent in the first place” on the
member state. Kudla v. Poland, App. No. 30210/96 (26 October
2000) at ¶ 130. It is the responsibility of “the State authorities to

KAHN

30

organise the investigation in such a way so as to comply with timelimits, without prejudicing the rights of defence.” Panchenko v.
Russia, App. No. 45100/98 (8 February 2005) at ¶ 134.
The word “charge” has autonomous substantive meaning
within the context of the Convention. Rokhlina v. Russia, App.
No. 54071/00 (7 April 2005) at ¶ 81. This is because “the
prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair
trial prompts the Court to prefer a „substantive‟, rather than a
„formal‟, conception of the „charge‟ contemplated by Article 6 par.
1 (art. 6-1). The Court is compelled to look behind the appearances
and investigate the realities of the procedure in question.”
Deweers v. Belgium, App. No. 6903/75 (27 February 1980) at ¶ 44
(internal citations omitted). The unchanging key to the European
Court‟s jurisprudence in this regard appears to be linked to notice
given the accused. Thus, while arrest is conventionally accepted as
one common indicia of the start of criminal proceedings for
purposes of determining their length, see e.g. Moiseyev v. Russia,
App. No. 62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009) at ¶ 190, the Court explained
that the measure of the length of proceedings starts
from an official notification given to an individual
by the competent authority of an allegation that he
has committed a criminal offence or some from
[sic] other act which carries the implication of such
an allegation and which likewise substantially
affects the situation of the suspect. According to
the Court‟s constant case-law, a person has been
found to be subject to a “charge”, inter alia, when a
preliminary investigation has been opened in his
case and, although not under arrest, the applicant
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has officially learned of the investigation or has
begun to be affected by it.

Kangasluoma v. Finland, App. No. 48339/99 (20 January 2004) at
¶ 26 (internal citation omitted). Likewise, “the period to be taken
into consideration in determining the length of criminal
proceedings normally ends with the day on which a charge is
finally determined or the proceedings are discontinued[.]”
Nakhmanovich, supra, at ¶ 88.
Whether the length of criminal proceedings is reasonable “must
be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with
reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the
conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities [.]” Sutyagin
v. Russia, App. No. 30024/02 (3 May 2011) at ¶ 150. In addition,
a fourth factor – the importance of the proceedings for the accused
– has also been adopted by the Court. In particular, “where a
person is kept in detention pending the determination of a criminal
charge against him, the fact of his detention is a factor to be
considered in assessing whether the requirement of a decision on
the merits within a reasonable time has been met.” Abdoella v. the
Netherlands, App. No. 12728/87 (25 November 1992) at ¶ 24.
Although “dilatory conduct” and behavior by the defendant
intended to “otherwise upset the proper conduct of the trial” will
be held against the applicant, Kudla, supra, at ¶ 130, delays
attributable to the defendant asserting his rights will not be held
against him. Moiseyev, supra, at ¶ 192. On the other hand,
“substantial periods of inactivity, for which the Government have
not submitted any satisfactory explanation, are attributable to the
domestic authorities.”
Skorobogatova v. Russia, App. No.
33914/02 (1 December 2005) at ¶ 49.
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c. Analysis
The determination of the length of proceedings – let alone the
reasonableness of this period – is likely to be a point of contention
between the parties. The Government authorities may view
February 2007, the date of the indictment, as the starting point, the
first trial proceedings having concluded with the defendants‟
conviction in 2005. The defendants may view July and October
2003 (the dates of their initial arrests) or even shortly earlier (the
point in time when they became aware that a criminal investigation
had been opened) as the starting point. The defendants may be
inclined to argue that the 2007 indictment was artificially separated
from the indictment leading to their first convictions,
notwithstanding their common facts, parties, and legal issues.
Indeed, these considerable common features between the two trials
would seem to lend support to the defendants‟ view.
The European Court‟s case law is unclear in this respect. The
Court has sometimes considered the finality of a criminal
conviction to be a reliable marker. Thus, in Löffler v. Austria,
App. No. 30546/96 (3 October 2000) at ¶ 19, the applicant was
convicted of murder but sought to reopen his criminal case on the
basis of DNA evidence, which ultimately led to his acquittal. In
measuring the length of the criminal proceedings for purposes of
evaluating his claim of a violation of Article 6, the European Court
held that the relevant start was the reopening of the case, not the
date when a criminal investigation was first initiated against the
applicant. The Court observed that the first proceedings had
become final at the time of the applicant‟s conviction; he could
have complained about their length at that time. Id.
On the other hand, a different conclusion was reached in
Stoianova & Nedelcu v. Romania, App. Nos. 77517/01 and
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77722/01 (4 August 2005). In that case, the applicants were
charged with robbery and held in custody for eight months in 1993
before being acquitted. The prosecution successfully appealed.
The case was reopened for investigation in 1994, then discontinued
in 1997, reopened again in 1999 with the addition of a new charge
(inciting witnesses to give false evidence), then discontinued in
2005 as time-barred. The Court measured the length of the
proceedings from the original arrest in 1993 (rather than having
begun with the reopening of the case in 1999) because the
prosecutor‟s discontinuance of the inquiry “was not a final
decision” Id. at ¶ 21. By this was meant the fact that “it was open
to the prosecution to reopen the criminal investigation without
having to seek leave from any domestic court that would have been
obliged to consider the application according to certain criteria,
including the fairness of reopening the case and whether an
excessive period had passed since the decision discontinuing the
investigation.” Id.
The present case fits more naturally within the analysis of the
Stoianova case. There, as here, the power in question is
prosecutorial discretion, which rests in the hands of the
Government authorities. As in the Stoianova case, a complaint
about the unreasonableness of the length of proceedings would be
based on the decisions of prosecutors concerning the timing of
their seriatim investigations and prosecutions for related acts. The
Löffler case is thus distinguishable in this respect. In Löffler, the
applicant himself sought to undo the finality of the proceedings
and was stymied by delays attributable both to the prosecuting
authorities and to the tribunal. In the Stoianova case, on the other
hand, the applicants sought repose from criminal proceedings
repeatedly opened and closed by an irresolute prosecuting
authority. As the Court noted in that case, “[t]he applicants were
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not responsible for those shortcomings on the part of the
authorities and should not therefore be put at a disadvantage as a
result of them.” Stoianova, supra, at ¶ 21.
The European Court and scholarly observers of its work have
frequently linked the guarantees of Article 6 to the rule of law. If
the Government authorities are unable to adequately explain why
the defendants were charged in serial fashion, rather than
investigated and charged for all offenses concerning their actions
as heads of Yukos, it would be difficult not to conclude that the
relevant starting point to determine the reasonableness of the
length of proceedings was the initial arrest of the defendants. As
noted, “substantial periods of inactivity, for which the Government
have not submitted any satisfactory explanation, are attributable to
the domestic authorities.” Skorobogatova v. Russia, App. No.
33914/02 (1 December 2005) at ¶ 49.
The materials provided for use in this report are inadequate to
reach a conclusion as to the credibility of an official explanation in
this regard. In this respect, however, it is worth noting that
pursuant to Article 79(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, the defendants
were eligible for conditional-early relief from their sentences after
having served at least half of the term of their punishment. The
announcement of a new criminal case was made in February 2007,
shortly before the defendants were eligible for parole. Although
beyond the scope of this analysis to confirm, it is also worth
considering the conclusion of the rapporteur of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, who personally observed both
the first and second trial of the defendants:
Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev complained
during their first trial of a parallel investigation
taking place by the general prosecutor‟s office.
They complained that they should have been
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notified of all charges against them at the very latest
at the start of the first trial in 2004 in accordance
with Article 6 of the ECHR. Some three years later,
just as they were becoming eligible for parole, they
were charged as a consequence of that parallel
investigation. The parallel investigation concerning
related allegations of impropriety should have been
concluded, disclosure made and a decision reached
as to whether further charges could or should be
brought, before the start of the first trial. Mr
Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev argue that it was an
intolerable abuse of process that the prosecution
should seek to conduct more than one investigation
into essentially the same alleged misconduct.

Document 11993, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights (Rapporteur Mrs. Sabine LeutheusserSchnarrenberger) (7 August 2009), at ¶ 101.
If the proceedings are judged to have begun with the
defendants‟ arrest in 2003, than they have lasted approximately 7½
years; if measured from the date of the second indictment, they
have lasted roughly four years. The case law of the European
Court is highly variable in its assessment of such time periods,
cases appearing on either side of the question of their
reasonableness. Thus, the Court has relied on case-by-case
evaluations of different factors. These factors are as follows.
(1) Complexity of the Case
There is likely to be a dispute between the parties regarding
this factor. The authorities will likely note that the case file
amounted to 188 volumes of evidence in a highly complex
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financial scheme of oil embezzlement and money laundering
involving multiple unindicted co-conspirators and numerous
corporate entities and structures in different national jurisdictions.
The defendants will likely assert that this complexity has been
manufactured by the novel theory of embezzlement proposed by
the prosecution in the first place. It should be noted, however, that
a finding of complexity – whether real or contrived – is not
necessarily determinative. The European Court found a violation
of Article 6 in Yagci & Sargin v. Turkey, App. No.
6/1994/453/533-534 (23 May 1995), notwithstanding the existence
in that case of 40 volumes of files concerning 16 defendants
represented by 400 lawyers over the course of 48 hearings. Id., at
¶¶ 11 & 60.
As Professor Trechsel has observed from the evolution of the
Court‟s case law, “[t]he only decisive element is, in fact, the way
in which the authorities dealt with the case. Whether the case is
complex or not is in essence entirely irrelevant – a violation will
only be found when there have been periods during the
proceedings where no action was taken, although something could
and should have been done.” Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in
Criminal Proceedings 143 (2005).
Thus, much depends on the determination of the starting point
of the proceedings. If the defendants‟ separate trials are judged to
have been artificially bifurcated, the European Court‟s assessment
of the state‟s delay in commencing the second prosecution may
well be determinative.
(2) The Applicant’s Conduct
The defendants maintained a vigorous defense, asserting their
rights and filing motions concerning the investigation and trial
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throughout the course of the proceedings. Any delays that may
have resulted from these actions, however, cannot be tolled against
the defendants. Moiseyev, supra, at ¶ 192. The Court has made
very clear that defendants are not to be blamed for delays
associated with the good-faith assertion of their rights, as Article 6
“does not require a person charged with a criminal offence to cooperate actively with the judicial authorities[.]” Yagci & Sargin v.
Turkey, App. No. 6/1994/453/533-534 (23 May 1995) at ¶ 66.
(3) Conduct of the Authorities
As already noted, this factor is often the determinative issue in
evaluating whether the length of the proceedings is unreasonable
as understood in the Court‟s Article 6 case law.
The failure to respect time limits established by the member
state‟s domestic law is often taken by the Court as prima facie
evidence that the length of the proceedings was unreasonable. The
materials provided for this report, and the time allotted to analyze
them, were not sufficient to undertake a complete analysis of the
compliance of the parties to the deadlines established by the RF
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Unexplained delays are often grounds for a finding of a
violation of Article 6 under this heading. As noted above, the
investigation of the defendants appears to have been conducted in a
staccato and serialized fashion. The first criminal investigation
preceded and immediately followed the arrest of the defendants in
2003.
The preliminary investigation continued up to the
defendants‟ trial, which commenced in June 2004 (but was
immediately adjourned and resumed the next month) and
concluded with the defendants‟ conviction in May 2005. It is
unclear what, if any, investigation occurred in the roughly two
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years intervening between the defendants‟ first conviction in May
2005 and the announcement of a new indictment in February 2007.
The indictment was not finally submitted to the Khamovnichesky
court until 14 February 2009; the trial began on 31 March 2009.
The materials available for the completion of this report do not
identify any stated reason for this delay of more than five years
between the defendants‟ arrests and the start of their second
criminal trial.
While the defendants remained in detention since July and
October 2003, their activities at Yukos were subject to extensive
investigation. Thus, the authorities‟ decision to prosecute the
defendants in seriatim proceedings several years apart is hard to
explain. Furthermore, as noted below, both the Government
authorities and the Khamovnichesky court in its verdict, frequently
categorized the defendants as having engaged in illegal but
uncharged activities, including fraud, bribery, deceit, and breach of
trust. By the time of the trial, however, these crimes (if they were
committed) were effectively time-barred. It is unclear whether the
more straightforward crimes noted above were left uncharged
because of lack of evidence (in which case their assertion without
evidence in the verdict may be evidence of violations of other
rights protected by the Convention) or because they were timebarred as a result of the delay in issuing the indictment in this
delayed fashion. This outcome is reminiscient of Panchenko v.
Russia, App. No. 45100/98 (8 February 2005) at ¶¶ 10-73, in
which eight years passed between the initiation of a criminal case
against the defendant (in custody for most of this time) and the
dismissal of charges due to the expiration of the statute of
limitations. The European Court had no difficulty finding a
violation of Article 6 in the Panchenko case, observing that it is
“incumbent on the State authorities to organise the investigation in
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such a way so as to comply with time-limits, without prejudicing
the rights of defence.” Id. at ¶ 134.
(4) Importance of the Proceedings
for the Accused
It cannot be gainsaid that the proceedings, on the outcome of
which their liberty depended, were of the utmost importance to the
accused. At the time that the new charges were made, as noted
above, the defendants were eligible for conditional-early relief
from their sentences after having served at least half of the term of
their punishment. Aside from this fact, the defendants‟ sentences
in the original case would have been satisfied in 2011, just as the
new sentences for these new convictions began. Thus the effect of
seriatim prosecution was to leave the defendants in a “state of
uncertainty about [their] fate.” Nakhmanovich v. Russia, App. No.
55669/00 (2 March 2006) at ¶ 89.
2. RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
a. Relevant Russian Law and Practice
The Constitution of the Russian Federation states, in relevant
part:
Article 118 § 1
Justice in the Russian Federation shall
administered only by courts of law.

be
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Article 120 § 1
Judges shall be independent and shall obey only the
Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal
law.
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
the Russian Federation are as follows:
Article 8 § 1
Justice in a criminal case in the Russian Federation
shall be administered solely by courts.
Article 15 § 3
3. A court is not an organ of criminal prosecution
and shall not take the prosecution or defense side in
a case. The court shall create the conditions
necessary for the parties to perform their procedural
duties and to exercise the rights granted to them.
b. Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:
In the determination … of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
… by an independent and impartial tribunal ….
It has long been established in the European Court‟s case law
that the word “impartial” carries both a subjective and objective
component. Under the heading of subjective impartiality is
understood the requirement that “no member of the tribunal should
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hold any personal prejudice or bias” against the accused. Daktaras
v. Lithuania, App. No. 42095/98 (10 October 2000) at ¶ 30. There
exists a rebuttable presumption of subjective impartiality.
Under the heading of objective impartiality is understood the
requirement that the tribunal “must offer sufficient guarantees to
exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). As to the objective component, “quite apart from the
judge‟s personal conduct,” the issue is:
whether, there are ascertainable facts which may
raise doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect
even appearances may be of a certain importance.
What is at stake is the confidence which the courts
in a democratic society must inspire in the public.
Accordingly, any judge in respect of whom there is
a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality
must withdraw. This implies that in deciding
whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason
to fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality, the
standpoint of the party concerned is important but
not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear
can be held to be objectively justified.
Sigurdsson v. Iceland, App. No. 39731/98 (10 April 2003) at ¶ 37.
In the Sigurdsson case, for example, the European Court
considered whether a supreme court justice should have recused
herself from a case involving a bank in which her husband was
simultaneously involved in certain financial negotiations. The
Court unanimously found a violation of the right to an impartial
tribunal notwithstanding its refusal to speculate “as to whether [the
justice] derived any personal benefit from the operation and finds
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no reason to believe that either she or her husband had any direct
interest in the outcome in the case between the applicant and the
National Bank.” Sigurdsson, supra, at ¶ 45. The standard of
objective impartiality is therefore a high one: there must be
“sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the
absence of inappropriate pressure.” Daktaras, supra, at ¶ 36.
c. Analysis
As to the evaluation of the subjective impartiality of the
Khamovnichesky court, the resources available to prepare this
report were insufficient to determine the existence, or assess the
merits, of allegations of bias held personally by Judge Danilkin
against the defendants. Likewise, the time allotted to complete this
report was not adequate to examine all of the relevant sources by
which to evaluate the objective component of the court‟s
impartiality.23 There is sufficient information surrounding a few
events close in time to the reading of the verdict, however, to call
into question the existence of suitable safeguards to guarantee the
objective component of the impartiality of the Khamovnichesky
court.
On 15 December 2010, a previously scheduled hearing to
announce the verdict of the court was postponed until 27
December 2010. The Court provided no explanation for this delay.
The following day, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, responding to a
23

For example, a defense motion dated 20 September 2010 referenced
accusations made by witness Pereverzin at the August 31, 2010 hearing that he
was offered a suspended sentence if he would testify against Khodorkovsky.
This motion makes other assertions of pressure concerning lawyer Aleksanyan,
witness Valdes Garcia, and others. It is simply not possible to evaluate these
claims with the materials and time available for this report.
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question about Khodorkovsky during a nationally-televised
program, said:
As to Khodorkovsky, I have already spoken out
many times on this account. If you consider that I
should say something else on this question, I may
do so. I, as well as the well-known character of
Vladimir Vysotsky, consider that a thief should sit
in jail. And in conformity with the decision of the
court, Khodorkovsky is charged with theft, a rather
large theft. It‟s about the non-payment of taxes and
fraud, and the account there goes to billions of
rubles. True, there is also the non-payment of
personal taxes, that is very important.
But the charge against him now goes to
hundreds of billions of rubles: 900 in one case, in a
second case - 800 billion rubles, also theft.
If we look at the practice in other countries, Mr.
Madoff in the U.S.A. received for an analogous
crime, yes and the money is roughly also the same,
150 years imprisonment. In my opinion, it looks
like everything we have is much more liberal.
Nevertheless, we should proceed from the fact that
the crimes of Mr. Khodorkovsky have been proven
in court.
Yes, and in addition, you well know, I want to
repeat once more, I am not speaking about him
personally, I would like to remind that the head of
the security service of Yukos sits in prison for
murder.
They didn‟t like the mayor of
Nefteyugansk, Petukhov – they murdered him. A
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woman here in Moscow did not give them her small
room, which they wanted to take – they murdered
her. A killer whom they hired, they murdered him.
Only the brains were found in a garage. Did the
head of the security service himself, on his own
initiative, carry out all of these crimes?
So, there is a court, we have, as is well-known,
one of the most humane in the world, this is its job.
I proceed from what was proven by the court.24
The Prime Minister‟s comments appeared to mix observations
about both the first, completed trial, and the second, then
unfinished one. Nevertheless, commentators and media in Russia
and elsewhere immediately interpreted his words as instructions to
the court in the still uncompleted second trial.25 The Prime
Minister first spoke about the first conviction, and then about the
second one. Then he said: “Nevertheless, we should proceed from
the fact that the crimes of Mr. Khodorkovsky have been proven in
court.” At this point it wasn't clear whether he was talking about
the first conviction or the second one. One might plausibly argue
that the reference to crimes that “have been proven in court”
unequivocally meant only the first conviction. On the other hand,
one can read the sentence as an expression of Putin's opinion: “the
crimes of Mr. Khodorkovsky” – both cases having been referenced
– “have been proven in the court.” By simple clarification, the
Prime Minister could have avoided this effect.
24

Transcript of program “A Conversation with Vladimir Putin. Continuation.”
The program aired on television channels “Rossiya” and “Rossiya 24,” and radio
stations “Mayak,” “Vesti FM,” and “Radio Rossiya.” 16 December 2010,
available at: http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/13427/.
25
See, e.g., Catherine Belton, Putin Remarks Dash Hopes for Khodorkovsky,
Financial Times (16 Dec. 2010).
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That the Prime Minister was aware of the effect his words
could have is suggested by his qualification of Khodorkovsky‟s
connection to underworld figures and various murders: the Premier
noted that he was not speaking about Khodorkovsky “personally.”
This caveat, of course, would have been unnecessary had the Prime
Minister not insinuated that Khodorkovsky, well-known as the
head of Yukos and whose relationships to other Yukos executives
was the basis for the charge that he was part of an “organized
criminal group,” was in that way connected to murders that “they”
committed. Lest the point be lost, the Prime Minister asked, “Did
the head of the security service himself, on his own initiative, carry
out all of these crimes?” The question, in context, clearly implied
a negative answer.
The Premier mixed into his remarks several references to
popular culture. The first reference, that “a thief should sit in jail,”
is to the well-known 1979 Soviet mini-series, The Meeting Place
Cannot be Changed (“Mesto vstrechi izmenit‟ nel‟zya”).26 The
quotation is from the tough detective played by Vladimir Vysotsky
and was clearly chosen because of its familiarity. The continuation
of that quote would be equally familiar to listeners: “… and people
don‟t care how I put him away.”27 In the context of the Yukos
case, these comments take on a sinister tone, especially given that
the Premier had been President at the time of the defendants‟ arrest
and first conviction. The timing of these remarks, after the
defendants‟ last word in the case sent the matter to the court‟s

26

Ellen Barry, Putin Speaks his Mind, and Then Some, on Television, N.Y.
Times (16 Dec. 2010).
27
The second reference, that the court is “one of the most humane in the world,”
is a quote from a 1967 Soviet comedy film, The Prisoner of the Caucasus, or the
New Adventures of Shurik (“Kavkazskaya plennitsa, ili Novye prikliucheniya
Shurika”).
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deliberation chamber but before the announcement of an
inexplicably postponed verdict, was particularly chilling.
Although they were far less disturbing in content, President
Medvedev likewise made remarks about the Khodorkovsky case
the day after the scheduled hearing on the defendants‟ appeal of
their conviction was postponed, again without any explanation. In
response to a questioner at a press conference at the Moscow
School of Management “Skolkovo,” the following exchange
occurred:
Y.Matsarskii: I represent radio station
“Kommersant”-FM,” my name is Yuri Matsarskii.
Dmitri Anatol‟evich, tell me, please, whether
Khodorkovsky‟s release would be a danger for
society?
D. Medvedev: The question is short and the
answer is also short: there would be absolutely no
danger.28
Although this statement would appear to cast the defendant in a
favorable light, it remains an extrajudicial comment on a pending
case. Indeed, the surprise postponement of yet another scheduled
hearing, followed by the widely disseminated comment of the
President, naturally led to speculation about the signals sent by this
protracted, public exchange about the defendants‟ fate between the
head of state and the head of the government.29
In light of these facts, it is easy to understand why the
European Court has emphasized that “even appearances may be of
28

Press Conference of the President of Russia, 18 May 2011, “Skolkovo”
School of Management (http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/11259).
29
Interfax, Russian Activists Welcome President's Comments About
Khodorkovskiy (18 May 2011) (http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russiaactivists-welcome-medvedev-comments-about-khodorkovsky-935.cfm).
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a certain importance” in setting a high standard for member states
to ensure the objective impartiality of the courts with “sufficient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the absence of
inappropriate pressure.” Daktaras v. Lithuania, supra, at ¶¶ 32,
36. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a
democratic society must inspire in the public and above all in the
parties to the proceedings.” Id. at ¶ 32 (internal citation omitted).30

30

Shortly after the defendants‟ conviction, several court officials alleged that
government officials had interfered in the drafting of the Khamovnichesky
Court‟s verdict. Most prominently, Natal‟ya Vasil‟eva, the Court‟s press
secretary, alleged that Judge Danilkin frequently received instructions with
regard to his supervision of the trial, including his verdict, from superiors in the
Moscow City Court. See Roman Badanin & Svetlana Bocharova, Prigovor byl
privezen iz Mosgorsuda, ya tochno znaiu, Gazeta.ru, 14 Feb. 2011. Igor‟
Kravchenko, a co-worker at the Khamovnichesky Court, subsequently gave
interviews in which he endorsed Vasil‟yeva‟s claims. See Svetlana Bocharova,
Interv’iu Vasil’evoi – Pravda, Gazeta.ru, 15 Apr. 2011. On 20 June 2011, the
Investigative Committee declined to open an investigation, rejecting the
credibility of these witnesses and the authenticity of their evidence. See
Svetlana Bocharova, Danilkinu ne nashli sostava, Gazeta.ru, 20 June 2011. It is
unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights would disturb this finding
absent an allegation of serious procedural irregularities in the Investigative
Committee‟s decision-making process: Article 13 of the Convention protects the
right to an effective remedy.
Another fruitful area of inquiry from the perspective of Article 6 § 1
concerns the legal authority of the Chairwoman of the Moscow City Court over
a particular judge. A lack of “structural independence” could establish a
violation of the Convention. See, e.g., Whitfield and others v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 46387/99 (12 Apr. 2005) at ¶¶ 42-46. The Parliamentary Assembly, at
the behest of two of its committees, expressed its concern in this regard with
particular attention to the informal practice of “telephone justice” and the power
of court chairpersons.
See Resolution 1685 (2009), adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 30 September 2009 (32nd
sitting); see also Document 12038, Opinion of the Committee on Economic
Affairs and Development (29 September 2009); and Document 11993, Report of
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (7 August 2009).
It is beyond the resources available for the writing of this report to
investigate the facts necessary to establish such violations.
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3. RIGHT TO A REASONED JUDGMENT
a. Relevant Russian Law and Practice
The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation are as follows:
Article 47 § 1
No one may be deprived of the right to have his
case examined by the court and judge to whose
jurisdiction it is assigned by law.
Article 49 § 1
Everyone accused of committing a crime shall be
presumed innocent until his guilt has been proved in
accordance with the procedure specified by federal
law and established by final judgment of a court.
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
the Russian Federation are as follows:
Article 7 § 4
Rulings by a court and orders by a judge,
procurator, investigator, or inquiry officer must be
legally correct, well-founded, and well-reasoned.
Article 297
1. The judgment of the court must be lawful, wellfounded and fair.
2. A judgment is deemed to be lawful, wellfounded and fair, if it is determined in compliance
with the requirements of this Code and is based on
the proper application of the criminal law.
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Article 299
1. When determining a judgment in the deliberation
room, the court shall decide the following issues:
1) whether it has been proven that the act the
defendant is charged with occurred;
2) whether it has been proven that the act was
committed by the defendant;
3) whether the act constitutes a crime and by
what Point, Paragraph and Article of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation it is punishable;
4)
whether the defendant is guilty of
committing the crime;
5) whether the defendant should be punished
for committing the crime;
6) whether there are circumstances that mitigate
or aggravate the punishment;
7) what sentence should be imposed on the
defendant;
8) whether there are grounds for a judgment of
guilty without sentence or for granting an
exemption from punishment; ***
Article 302 § 4
A judgment of conviction may not rest upon
speculation and such a judgment shall be rendered
only if the guilt of the defendant in committing the
crime is confirmed by the totality of the evidence
examined by the court.
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Article 303 § 1
Upon deciding the issues referred to in Article 299 of
this Code, the court shall proceed to write the
judgment. It shall be written in the language in which
the trial was conducted and consist of an introductory
part, a narrative-rationale part, and an operative part.
Article 307
The narrative-rationale part of a judgment of
conviction must contain:
1) a description of the criminal act which the court
determined was proven, with reference to the place,
time and mode of its commission, the nature of the
guilt involved in and the motives, objectives and
consequences of the crime;
2) the evidence on which the court‟s findings
regarding the defendant are based and the reasons the
court rejected other evidence;
3) references to any circumstances mitigating or
aggravating punishment, and reference to the grounds
and reasons for modifying the charge if some part of
the charge was found not to be well-founded or there
was an erroneous classification of the crime;
4) the reasons for the court‟s decision on all the
issues relevant to the sentence, any exemption from
imposition of a sentence or from serving it, and for
the application of other measures;
5) the grounds for any decisions made with
respect to other issues referred to in Article 299 of
this Code.
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b. Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:
In the determination … of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
… by an independent and impartial tribunal ….

This provision has been interpreted to require that courts give
reasons for their judgments. See Van de Hurk v. The Netherlands,
App. No. 16034/90 (19 Apr. 1994) at ¶ 61. In particular, courts
must “indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they
based their decision.” Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, App. No.
12945/87 (16 Dec. 1992) at ¶ 33. The court is “under a duty to
conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and
evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its
assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision[.]” Kraska
v. Switzerland, App. No. 13942/88 (19 Apr. 1993) at ¶ 30.
On the other hand, the European Court has held that Article 6
“cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every
argument.” Van de Hurk, supra, at ¶ 61. “Nor is the European
Court called upon to examine whether arguments are adequately
met.” Id. It is not the task of the European Court, but for the
national courts, to determine whether a submission by a party is
well-founded. Hiro Balani v. Spain, App. No. 18064/91 (9 Dec.
1994) at ¶ 28; Ruiz Torija v. Spain, App. No. 18390/91 (9 Dec.
1994) at ¶¶ 29-30.
The determination of a violation of the right to a reasoned
judgment can only be made on a case-by-case basis “in the light of
the circumstances of the case.” Helle v. Finland, App. No.
157/1996/776/977 (19 Dec. 1997) at ¶ 55. This is because “the
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extent to which the duty to give reasons applies may vary
according to the nature of the decision at issue. It is moreover
necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity of the
submissions that a litigant may bring before the courts and the
differences existing in the Contracting States with regard to
statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and the
presentation and drafting of judgments.” Id. A margin of
appreciation is accorded to national law and practice.
Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, App. No. 12945/87 (16 Dec. 1992) at
¶ 33.
Professor Trechsel has elaborated on the importance of this
requirement from the perspective of legal theory:
The only possibility to verify a hypothesis in law
lies in the reasons given. They must be complete
and logical. Without reasons, a decision cannot
claim to have legal character, let alone to be correct.
Thus, without reasoning it would not be possible to
distinguish a correct judgment from an arbitrary
one. In other words, a judgment which does not
give reasons may not be, but certainly appears to be
arbitrary.
Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings 103-4
(2005). In addition, the requirement of reasoned judgments has
numerous “instrumental and intrinsic virtues” for the pursuit of
justice in a democratic society that have been widely recognized,
including the value that inheres in the guarantee that a person is
“being treated with dignity as a person, a sovereign agent, and not
merely as an object who can be manipulated at the will of the
authorities.” Paul Roberts, Does Article 6 of the European
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Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned Verdicts in
Criminal Trials? 11 Human Rights Law Review 213, 215 (2011).
c. Analysis of the Verdict
At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive to suggest that a
verdict of 689 pages may violate the right to a reasoned judgment
guaranteed under Article 6 of the Convention. The verdict‟s
volume, however, should not be confused with its mass. The
verdict is indeed voluminous. Its concentration of legal reasoning,
however, is slight. Under the European Court‟s standards, its
failings violate the right to a reasoned judgment protected by
Article 6.
(1) Pages 3-130
The narrative-rationale part of the verdict, required by Article
303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, begins on page 3 under the
heading “Established” («Установил»). The court appears to have
complied with the Code‟s requirements in the most hyper-literal
fashion. On pages 3-130, the court presents its “description of the
criminal act which the court determined was proven,” as required
by Art. 307(1). On pages 130-132, the court summarizes the
defendants‟ separate arguments and testimony in their defense. On
pages 133-615, the court presents “the evidence on which the
court‟s findings regarding the defendant[s] are based and the
reasons the court rejected other evidence” as required by Art.
307(2).
With regard to pages 3-130 of the narrative-rationale part of the
verdict, these cannot be understood to have “established” anything
at all because no evidence is cited from any source. The assertions
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and conclusions in this section might be described as a summary of
the court‟s findings were this section not so long (especially as
compared to the summary of the defendants‟ responses to these
charges on pages 130-132, which is less than 2% of this amount).
There is no attribution of any particular assertion of fact to any
piece of evidence in the record. Nor is there any evaluation (or
even acknowledgment of the existence) of conflicting evidence.
Nor is there legal analysis that would apply evidence to law. Thus,
this section reads more like a prosecutor‟s indictment than a
court‟s reasoned judgment. Indeed, as noted below, that appears to
be its provenance. It cannot be described as a reasoned evaluation
of the evidence.
The artificial division of the court‟s conclusions from the
evidentiary basis for them obscures instances where the court fails
to provide any reason, in law or evidence, for its verdict. Thus, on
page 4, the court concludes: “The given contract was wrongful and
contradicted the fundamental principles of civil law under Art. 1 of
the RF Civil Code, since OAO NK Yukos as a legal entity was
placed from the outset in such conditions under which it exercised
its civil rights not by its own will, but by the will of a group of its
core shareholders – which by this time had become M.B.
Khodorkovsky, P.L. Lebedev and the members of the organised
group acting jointly with them – and not in its own interests, but in
the interests of the given organised group.”31 However, neither in
this section nor later in the verdict are the “fundamental principles
of civil law” identified or an explanation given as to how the
contract was “wrongful” or “contradicted” them.
Additional evidence of the lack of reasoning in this section of
the verdict manifests itself in its drafting. Multiple pages and
paragraphs of text are duplicated, as if cut-and-pasted from one
31

On page 89, the court makes a similar assertion.
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part of this section to another. Thus, the seventy-six lines of text
on pages 7 through 9 are identical to the text on pages 75 through
77 with the exception of seven lines of text added to page 8 and a
few other very minor differences.32 Likewise, the last two
paragraphs on page 12 are, with the exception of the last ten words,
identical to the last two paragraphs on page 13. Twenty-two lines
on pages 18 and 19 are virtually identical (save for one new
sentence, one name, and assorted typographical errors) to lines
found on pages 104 and 105.33 One hundred fourteen lines on
pages 20 through 22 are virtually identical to lines found on pages
105 through 107.34 The last two paragraphs on page 30,
amounting to seventeen lines of text, are identical to the first two
paragraph on page 31. The 56 lines on pages 74 and 75 are
virtually identical to lines found on pages 105 and 106.35

32

The differences are that Khordokovsky‟s name appears twice and the names
of two companies are added on pages 75-77, which references do not appear on
pages 7-9. In addition, one preposition («В» on page 7 becomes «Причем» on
page 75) and one noun («сущности» on page 7 becomes «сути» on page 76) are
changed and the phrase «иных/е лиц(а)» is added in three places on page 76.
33
The differences are that Lebedev‟s name appears on page 19 but is omitted
from the same text on page 104; the word «указанным» on page 19 becomes
«этим» on page 104.
34
The differences are that in the latter version, Khodorkovsky‟s name and the
name of an additional company are added to text on page 105, the order of two
paragraphs is inverted, the characterization «находящиеся в розыске» has been
added to the paragraphs describing five individuals, the words «успешной
преступной» on page 20 have been deleted from their corresponding place on
page 105, the words «распоряжались» and «вопреки их интересам» on page
21 have been deleted from their corresponding places on page 106, and the
words «иное» and «указанного иное» on page 22 have been changed to
«указанное» and «данного» on page 107. There are also a number of minor
typographical and punctuation errors found in these pages.
35
The differences are that the word «Через» on page 74 becomes «по» and the
name of a company is added on page 105, and ten lines of text are inserted on
page 106 along with the word «затем». A comma is also omitted on page 105
from the text that appears on page 74.
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Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the verdict‟s composition
in this regard is its extensive duplication of the indictment
(«Обвинительное
заключение
по
уголовному
делу
№18/432766-07»). The indictment, of course, is composed by a
criminal investigator pursuant to Article 220 and approved and
forwarded to the court by the prosecutor pursuant to Article
221(1)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, both of whom are
participants in the criminal proceedings on the prosecution side, as
indicated in Articles 37 and 38 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
By law, the indictment must indicate, inter alia, “the nature of the
charges, the place and the time of the commission of the crime,
how it was committed, the motives, goals and consequences
involved and other circumstances that are relevant to the criminal
case; a statement of the charges brought, citing the Point,
Paragraph and Article of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation that specifies liability for the crime; a list of the
evidence supporting the charges made; [and] a list of the evidence
relied on by the defense”.36
In this case, the indictment consists of fourteen-volumes
containing 3460 pages. Astonishingly, the first 130 pages of the
verdict (and, quite possibly, much more) is a near exact copy of the
indictment. An annotated copy of those pages, indicating all
differences and identifying the source of the material in the
indictment, is attached to this report as an appendix. The vast
majority of differences between the two documents are not
substantive differences. Thus, the indictment frequently identifies
by name individuals to whom the verdict refers in general terms as
“members of the organized group” or “other persons.” Similarly,
the verdict tends to include the initials of Khodorkovsky‟s first
name and patronymic (omitted from the indictment) and often adds
36

Article 220(1)(3)-(6) RF Code of Criminal Procedure.
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Lebedev‟s name alongside that of Khodorkovsky. Abbreviations
may be spelled out, spaces added, or symbols changed into words
(as, for example, “%” to “per cent”). Occasionally, the name of a
company listed alongside many others in the indictment is omitted
from the verdict, although this is rare. Otherwise, the texts are
identical. This perhaps explains the odd duplications identified in
the text accompanying footnotes 22 through 25 of this report: they
were simply carried over from the same duplication in the
indictment.
Such brazen copying is compelling circumstantial evidence
that the court has not engaged in its own process of reasoned
decisionmaking to reach its judgment. It is also persuasive support
for a finding that the court has violated other rights held by the
accused under the European Convention, including the right to an
independent and impartial tribunal and the right to equality of
arms.
(2) Pages 133-615
Even if this cutting-and-pasting between indictment and verdict
were to be disregarded as insufficient proof, eo ipso, that the court
failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking, the manner in which
the remainder of the verdict relates the evidence to the charges
draws the court‟s reasoning process into serious question. In short,
the court frequently identifies evidence but rarely reasons from it
to a legal conclusion. In this way, the verdict mimics what was
observed at trial by a rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe:
The trial itself, so far, consists in reading out,
apparently at random, short passages of corporate
and other documents without any discussion of their
significance, even from the point of view of the

KAHN

58

accusation. The demand of Mr. Lebedev “that the
prosecutors explain which evidence corresponded to
which episode and charge” seems reasonable to me,
as does the insistence of the defence lawyers that
“the documents should be not only read out but also
examined.” To me, this should go without saying in
any trial.
Document 11993, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights (Rapporteur Mrs. Sabine LeutheusserSchnarrenberger) (7 August 2009) at ¶ 99.
The verdict makes its first citation to any piece of evidence in
the record on page 133. From that page to page 615, the court
provides lists of evidence from identified portions of the record.
Each list is headed by a paragraph (sometimes) set in boldface
type. The boldface paragraph is written in a standard form that
states a conclusion and then provides a list of evidence (with
citation to the case file or trial record) as support for that
conclusion. This section appears to be organized to conform with
the literal requirement of Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Code to “contain … the evidence on which the court‟s findings
regarding the defendant are based … .”
However, the listing of documents under a conclusory heading
is not equivalent to reasoning from this evidence to conclude that
the elements of the charged offenses have been proven. For
example, the court‟s first boldface heading appears at page 140:
The court links building of a vertically-integrated
structure of management of OAO NK Yukos with
the [criminal] intent of the defendants aimed at
creating conditions for oil theft. Creation with the
involvement of M.B. Khodorkovsky and P.L.
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Lebedev of the executive bodies for the oil
producing companies represented by ZAO Yukos
EP turned out to be one of such conditions.

The verdict then states that “This circumstance is corroborated
by:” and follows this phrase with a list of nine pieces of evidence
from the case file, including five sets of minutes of shareholders
meetings, three contracts, and a corporate order, all of which are
described as concerning the transfer of powers between different
companies. No part of any document is quoted to support its
conclusory description by the court. No analysis of this evidence
is provided nor an explanation offered to support the conclusion
asserted in the boldface heading. Nor is the concept of establishing
a “link” between the Yukos corporate structure and the defendants‟
criminal intent explicated in terms of Russian law.
As another example, the boldface heading on page 143 states:
The guilt of the defendants in building of the
vertically-integrated structure of management as a
mechanism of management of the process of theft
and realization of the stolen oil by means of
establishing ZAO Yukos RM and transfer to it of
the required powers is corroborated by:
Twenty-four items of evidence are then listed with brief summaries
of their contents: the testimony of two witnesses, eight sets or
extracts of corporate minutes, a corporate charter, seven contracts,
three corporate orders, a power of attorney, an extract from a share
registry, and an “information statement.”
No analysis is
conducted. Nor is any interpretation of these materials – on their
faces, ordinary business documents – provided to explain how the
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court concluded from them that they indicate any form of “guilt”
or intent to organize these entities for the “management of the
process of theft and realization of the stolen oil.” Indeed,
Khodorkovsky is mentioned in only two of these documents, in
both cases extracts of minutes from general shareholders meetings
at which he appeared as chairman of the board of ZAO Yukos RM.
Sometimes the court asserts to have established facts and legal
positions that in fact have not been established. On page 147, the
court asserts that “[i]t has been established” that the corporate
structure it has described in the preceding pages “was an abuse of
right.” But no such legal analysis was attempted in the preceding
section of the verdict, nor was the particular right the court states
to have been abused even identified in Russian law. The court
continues that these structures “entailed violation of equality of its
participants since, as legal entities, the oil producing companies
were intentionally put at a disadvantage when they were unable to
exercise their rights at their own will and to achieve the major goal
of their activity – generating profit.” But no evidence appears in
the preceding section concerning any profit at all. Finally, the
court continues that “The management of the oil producing
enterprises was performed exclusively in the interests of the group
of the main shareholders which, by that time, already included
M.B. Khodorkovsky and P.L. Lebedev, as well as other members
of the organized group acting together with them.” On the
contrary, no evidence concerning the “interests” of anyone is
presented. The minutes, charters, and other corporate documents
merely describe the basic organizational structures of these
companies, and their relationships with other companies.
Another example of a conclusory heading unsubstantiated by
the evidence listed in support of it is found on pages 155-157. In
this section, the court states that “the following pieces of evidence”
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established the defendants‟ “purpose of facilitating and
concealment of the commitment of the theft of oil from the oil
producing companies[.]” The documents that follow are the 1996
charters for Yuganskneftegas, Samaraneftegas and Tomskneft
VNK, contracts establishing terms for the future conclusion of oil
purchase and sale contracts, an amendment to one of those
contracts, and an undated document that the court asserts was
approved by Khodorkovsky and that states “… responsibility of
officers and Board members to shareholders for decisions that
should have definitely lead to losses for the entity (trading
transactions are unequivocally such since they formally lead to
understatement of the plant‟s profit) provided for by the law is also
a factor that would be desirable to be avoided.” Other than the
bare description of these items, nothing more is said. There is no
legal analysis applying the relevant Russian law to these
documents or explaining how they demonstrate the intent of
anyone to steal oil, which on their face they do not.
This technique continues through page 615 of the verdict. A
heading (usually in boldface type) asserts the establishment of
some fact or legal conclusion. Documents from the case file or
testimony from the trial record are then listed. But the conclusion
or fact is not apparent on the face of the listed evidence and no
attempt is made by the court to explain how it reached such a
conclusion.
In other parts of the verdict, the court reaches conclusions
about the defendants‟ intent that are not only unsupported by the
evidence it references, but contradicted by it. On page 157, the
verdict presents one of its boldface conclusions:
The guilt of the defendants in the arrangement of
conditions for stealing of the oil under the guise of
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concluding of the economically unfounded general
agreements is also corroborated by the pieces of
evidence examined by the court in the course of the
trial:
There then follows one piece of evidence entitled “Draft
decisions of the Board of Directors of OAO Tomskneft VNK of 22
January 1999, including the following records”. On the basis of
this document, the verdict states:
The court presumes that this document corroborates
the intent of the defendants to embezzle the oil
produced at the price of RUB 250 per tonne, while
they were aware of the fact that its market price was
RUB 1,665.61 [per tonne] which also corroborates
their intent to embezzle someone else‟s property by
means of clearly nonequivalent payment of its
value.
On the contrary, the document as described in the verdict does
nothing more than indicate that two different markets were in
operation, a domestic market and a foreign market for oil. The
document indicates the relative values at which the oil traded in
both markets. But the verdict, while identifying two prices, refers
to only one market. By eliding this fact of two separate markets,
the court creates the false impression that only one market was in
operation with only one price set for the sale of oil.
The very next piece of evidence cited in the verdict, at page
159-160, in fact confirms the very opposite of this assertion. The
court cites the minutes of a shareholders meeting for OAO
Tomskneft of 16-29 March 1999 at which the oil purchases
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referenced in the previous document are approved.
This
document, as described in the verdict, makes clear that sales will
occur at the different prices determined by the relevant markets:
As a result of the voting, the majority made the
following decision: since the production and the
sale of oil produced has for a long time been regular
business activities of OAO Tomskneft VNK, to
declare the production and the sale of oil to be the
core activities of OAO Tomskneft VNK in future as
well, and, to this end, to conduct transactions on
purchase and sale of the oil and/or oil-well fluid on
behalf of OAO Tomskneft VNK in compliance with
the following set conditions: sale of the oil
produced by OAO Tomskneft VNK, to the
following companies: OAO NK Yukos, OAO VNK,
Total International Limited, Behles Petroleum S.A.,
ROSCO S.A. in the amount of 50 million tonnes
over the period of 3 years at the current market
price of RUB 250.08 per tonne in the domestic
market and RUB 1,665.61 per tonne in the foreign
market of the RF;
Although the verdict states that this document corroborates its
statement that the defendants intended to embezzle oil by using a
lower price than “its market price,” the evidence that the court cites
in fact reveals two markets, not one, and for sales to both domestic
and foreign companies.
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(3) Responsiveness of the Verdict
to Defense Arguments
The above analysis of the verdict‟s composition and substance
suggests a lack of reasoning that would violate Article 6.
However, the European Court typically gives a margin of
appreciation to the practices of member states. Unless the critiques
made of this verdict were particularly unusual or egregious
compared to other Russian verdicts – an analysis in which the
European Court may decline to engage – an application to the
Court alleging a violation of Article 6 on these grounds may meet
with a cool reception. On the other hand, the Court may find a
violation that would require systemic change in judicial practice.
Predicting either course is very difficult.
More commonly, individual applications complaining of a
violation of this section of the Convention allege failures of the
court to respond to particular evidence or arguments by a party,
rather than to a critique of the quality of the reasoning process
within the judgment itself. In this regard, the record may well
reveal lacunae where responses to motions and arguments by the
defendants should appear.
Regretfully, this report cannot engage in that analysis with any
certainty. It has not been possible to verify whether the record of
materials to which the author of this report was directed,
www.khodorkovsky.ru, contains a complete collection of defense
motions and judicial responses to them. Thus, in a summarizing
statement delivered toward the end of the defendants‟ presentation
of their case, defense attorney Elena Liptser and others stated that
“in the course of the pre-trial proceedings there were numerous
occasions when the investigators refused to admit exculpatory
evidence in relation to our clients, concealed documents substantial
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for the case, falsified circumstances and arguments set out to
substantiate procedural decisions, and ignored provisions of
law.”37 Although some of the issues to which Liptser alluded
concerning the admission of exculpatory evidence will be
discussed under the heading of Article 6 § 3, infra, it has simply
not been possible to isolate and examine discrete instances of the
actions she describes. Nor has there been a sufficient opportunity
to peruse with care the transcript of the trial proceedings. The
issue can only be flagged for the potential violation that may sit
within it.
C. ARTICLE 6 § 2 – THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
1. RELEVANT RUSSIAN LAW AND PRACTICE
The Constitution of the Russian Federation states, in relevant
part:
Article 49
1. Everyone accused of committing a crime shall be
presumed innocent until his guilt has been proved in
accordance with the procedure specified by federal
law and established by final judgment of a court.
2. The defendant shall not be obliged to prove his
innocence.
3. Any remaining doubts about guilt shall be
resolved in favor of the defendant.
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
the Russian Federation are as follows:
37

http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/sites/khodorkovskycenter.com/files/20%
20September%202010%20Liptser%20Statement.pdf.
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Article 14
1. An accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty of a crime in accordance with the procedures
specified in this Code and determined by a final
court judgment.
2. A suspect or accused is not required to prove his
innocence. The burden of proof of the charges and
negation of defense arguments rests on the
prosecution.
3. All doubts as to the guilt of an accused that
cannot be dispelled by means of the procedures
established by this Code shall be resolved in favor
of the accused.
4. A judgment of conviction may not be based on
supposition.
Article 74
1. The evidence in a criminal case is any
information that provides a basis for a court,
procurator, investigator, or inquiry officer to
determine, in accordance with the procedures
established by this Code, whether circumstances
that are subject to proof in proceedings in a criminal
case, or other circumstances relevant to the case,
exist.
2. The following are admissible as evidence:
1) testimony given by a suspect or accused;
2) testimony given by a victim or witness;
3) report and testimony of an expert;
3.1) report and testimony of a specialist;
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4) physical evidence;
5) official records of investigative and
judicial actions;
6) other documents.
Article 79
1. Witness testimony consists of information
communicated by a witness during questioning
conducted in the course of pre-trial proceedings or
in court in accordance with the requirements of
Articles 187-191 and 278 of this Code.
2. A witness may be questioned about any
circumstances relevant to the criminal case,
including the character of the accused or the victim,
and about the relationship between them and other
witnesses.
Article 87
Verification of evidence shall be undertaken by an
inquiry officer, investigator, procurator, or court by
means of comparing it to other evidence available in
the criminal case file and also by identifying its
source and obtaining other evidence that
corroborates or contradicts the evidence being
reviewed.
Article 217 § 1
After fulfilling the requirements of Article 216 of this
Code the investigator shall present bound and
numbered volumes of the criminal case file to the
accused and to his defense counsel, except in the
situations specified by Article 166(9) of this Code. …
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2. RELEVANT ECHR PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to
law.
Professor Trechsel has distinguished the “outcome-related
aspect” of the presumption of innocence from its “reputationrelated” aspect. The former regards
the psychological climate in which proceedings
ought to unfold and it requires that the prosecutor
and the judge adopt a particular attitude. Even
though, deep down in their hearts, they may be
convinced of the accused‟s guilt, they must remain
open to a change of opinion in view of the result of
the evidence. They are prohibited from doing or
saying anything, before the judgment has been
delivered, which implies that the defendant has
already been convicted.
Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings 163
(2005). The latter regards the treatment of the accused by state
officials other than the prosecutor and judge. The accused “who
has not been convicted in criminal proceedings must not be treated
or referred to by persons acting for the state as guilty of an
offence.” Id. at 164.
As the European Court has frequently stated, the presumption
of innocence is “violated if a statement of a public official
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concerning a person charged with a criminal offence reflects an
opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved so according to
law. It suffices, even in the absence of any formal finding, that
there is some reasoning to suggest that the official regards the
accused as guilty. In this regard the Court emphasises the
importance of the choice of words by public officials in their
statements before a person has been tried and found guilty of an
offence. ” Daktaras v. Lithuania, App. No. 42095/98 (10 October
2000), at ¶ 41 (internal citation omitted).
It should be noted that “the presumption of innocence may be
infringed not only by a judge or court but also by other public
authorities.” Allenet de Ribemont v. France, App. No. (15175/89),
at ¶ 36. In that foundational case, the European Court found that
remarks by high-ranking officials at a press conference two weeks
prior to the formal charging of the accused violated his right to be
presumed innocent: “some of the highest-ranking officers in the
French police referred to [the applicant], without any qualification
or reservation, as one of the instigators of a murder and thus an
accomplice in that murder … . This was clearly a declaration of the
applicant‟s guilt which, firstly, encouraged the public to believe
him guilty and, secondly, prejudged the assessment of the facts by
the competent judicial authority.” Id. at ¶ 41.
Conditions of detention during judicial proceedings have also
been considered under the heading of the principle of the
presumption of innocence. This may represent a transition in the
Court‟s interpretation of the Convention, as the case law is mixed.
In a Commission Report that does not reveal the factual
circumstances of the application beyond the complaint that the
applicant had been held in a “glass cage” during his trial, a
majority of the Commission found no violation of Article 6 § 2.
Auguste v. France, App. No. 11837/85 (13 February 1991). More
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recently, the Court held that the use of a metal cage in an appellate
courtroom did not violate the applicant‟s presumption of innocence
(although it did work a violation of Article 3) because it was “a
permanent security measure used for all criminal cases” and
therefore “the imposition of this measure does not suggest that the
Court of Appeal regarded the applicant as guilty.” Harutyunyan v.
Armenia, App. No. 34334/04 (15 June 2010), at ¶ 138. The Court
did not address concerns it has expressed about what Judge
Trechsel has termed the “reputation-related” aspect of the
presumption of innocence.
However, in another case concerning a metal cage, the Court
expressed concern that “a harsh and hostile appearance of judicial
proceedings could lead an average observer to believe that
extremely dangerous criminals were on trial” when in fact the
defendants could not be so characterized.
Ramishvili &
Kokhreidze v. Georgia, App. No. 1704/06 (27 January 2009), at ¶
100. The Court observed that this could be seen as “undermining
the principle of the presumption of innocence.” Id. In this context,
the Court has noted that “[s]uch harsh treatment could easily have
had an impact on the applicants‟ powers of concentration and
mental alertness during the proceedings bearing on such an
important issue as their physical liberty, thus calling for very close
scrutiny by the Court.” Id.
3. ANALYSIS
Many different bases may be suggested for a violation of the
presumption of innocence, but three are identified with
particularity here. One basis for a violation may be the detention
of the defendants in the courtroom in a glass and metal cage
flanked by guards. A second may be statements made by officials
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concerning the guilt of the defendants prior to the deliberation on
their guilt by the court. These officials may be associated with the
trial (e.g. statements by prosecutors at press conferences) or not
(e.g. high government officials). A third basis for a violation of
the presumption of innocence is worked by a strange feature of
Russian criminal procedure that results from its contradictory
merging of inquisitorial and adversarial principles of justice.
(a) Conditions of Detention in the Courtroom
The national and international media frequently reported that
the defendants were detained in glass and metal containers during
all courtroom proceedings. The defense filed an (unsuccessful)
motion to allow Khodorkovsky to sit with his lawyers, rather than
in the “aquarium.” This container was also guarded by several
police. It has been reported that these police were armed, but the
author of this report lacks any official records by which to
corroborate these journalistic descriptions. Based on the finding of
a violation of Article 3 in regard to Khodorkovsky‟s detention in
the courtroom during his first trial, however, such reports seem
prima facie credible.
As noted above, the case law of the European Court is mixed
on this question and may be in a state of transition. In at least one
case, the Court has declined to find a violation of Article 6 § 2
even when it has found a violation of Article 3 under the same
facts. Harutyunyan v. Armenia, App. No. 34334/04 (15 June
2010), at ¶ 139.
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(b) Extra-judicial statements of guilt
In this regard, the analysis, supra, of the Prime Minister‟s
remarks during a nationally broadcast television program
immediately following the unexplained cancellation of the hearing
at which the verdict was expected to be announced, is also relevant
to the issue of their perceived impact on the court‟s independence
and impartiality.
As noted above, the European Court has been categorical in
finding that the presumption of innocence “will be violated if a
statement of a public official concerning a person charged with a
criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has
been proved so according to law.” Butkevicius v. Lithuania, App.
No. 48297/99 (26 March 2002), at ¶ 49. The facts of that case are
instructive. The Lithuanian Minister of Defense was caught in
flagrante delicto receiving an envelope full of money alleged to be
a bribe. A few days after his arrest, the national press quoted the
Prosecutor General as saying that he had “sound evidence of the
guilt” of the minister and the Chairman of the Seimas called the
minister a “bribetaker,” saying he “entertain[ed] no doubt” that the
minister took a bribe. The parliament stripped the minister of his
parliamentary immunity and he was subsequently charged with
obtaining property by deception, a crime different than accepting a
bribe.
The European Court was unpersuaded by the Government
authorities‟ argument to consider the evidentiary context (the
minister was caught red-handed), the purpose of the impugned
statements (explaining the need to deny parliamentary immunity),
and the fact that the officials‟ statements concerned a crime with
which the minister had not been charged. The Court noted that the
statements were made to the national press and “amounted to
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declarations by a public official of the applicant‟s guilt, which
served to encourage the public to believe him guilty and prejudged
the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority.”
Id. at ¶ 53.
In the present case, the circumstances are even more extreme.
On the very day announced for the rendering of its verdict, the
court postponed the proceedings with a perfunctory note on the
door of the court. No reason was provided. The Prime Minister‟s
strong words, implying not just guilt of theft but also implicating
the defendants in uncharged violent crimes, carried exceptional
force. This is especially the case given the controlled environment
– a nationally broadcast call-in program – in which the Prime
Minister elected to make them. It is because of the power of such
statements, magnified by national news media, that the Court has
emphasized “the importance of the choice of words by public
officials in their statements before a person has been tried and
found guilty of an offence.” Daktaras v. Lithuania, App. No.
42095/98 (10 October 2000), at ¶ 41 (internal citation omitted).
(c) Evidentiary Presumptions favoring
the Prosecution Side38
Legal presumptions affect several aspects of the right to a fair
trial, implicating as they do the guarantee of an impartial tribunal
and their effect on the fundamental presumption of innocence.
Article 6 § 2 “does not therefore regard presumptions of fact or of
law provided for in the criminal law with indifference. It requires
38

This section draws on Jeffrey Kahn, Adversarial Principles and the Case File
in Russian Criminal Procedure, in Russia and the Council of Europe: Ten Years
After (Katlijn Malfliet & Stephen Parmentier, eds. 2010), and William Burnham
and Jeffrey Kahn, Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code Five Years Out, 33
Review of Central & East European Law (2008).
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States to confine them within reasonable limits which take into
account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights
of the defence.” Salabiaku v. France, App. No. 10519/83 (7
October 1988), at ¶ 28.
Although Russian law has embraced the concept of adversarial
proceedings, and purports to place the defence on an equal footing
with the prosecution, the law retains certain provisions from its
past, decidedly non-adversarial approach to criminal justice. This
hybrid of inquisitorial and adversarial principles results in legal
presumptions in favor of the evidence collected by the state. This
is a violation both of the equality of arms protected by Article 6 § 3
(discussed below) and the presumption of innocence.
The Russian Code of Criminal Procedure departs from the
previous (Soviet) criminal procedure codes by identifying the
investigator as a participant on the prosecution side and by
granting the defense the right to gather and present evidence. In
other words, the Code departs from the civil-law tradition that the
investigator is a neutral state official who conducts a “complete
and objective investigation,” a phrase used in the previous code of
criminal procedure that was almost completely eliminated from the
current one.39 This would seem to be in keeping with adversarial
principles, established in the Code, that provide for the right of the
defense “to gather and present evidence as is necessary to provide
legal representation.” Such a right would appear to establish the
requisite equality of arms with the prosecution side.
However, although Russian criminal procedure foresees the
possibility of dual pre-trial investigations by partisan parties to the
case in search of evidence, it still primarily relies on the case file.
39

Article 152(4) of the Code, for example, a venue provision, states that: “The
preliminary investigation may be conducted where the accused or the majority
of witnesses are located, in order to secure its completeness, objectivity and
compliance with procedural time limits.”
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And although that case file has ostensibly been stripped of the
imprimatur of officialdom, it remains the dynamo that drives nonjury criminal cases. Indeed, under Article 217 of the Code, the
case file is not to be presented to the accused and to his defense
counsel until its volumes have been “bound and numbered.”
Although this would seem to be a reasonable precaution against
post hoc additions to the case file, it also has the effect of
preventing evidence obtained by the accused from being accorded
an equal place in the records on which the court relies so heavily
during the proceedings.
Furthermore, the Code gives the contents of the case file a
presumptively special status as evidence. Article 74 defines
evidence and then lists all the items that are considered to be
“admissible evidence,” among them “testimony” given by a victim,
witness, or expert. But testimony of a witness is itself defined in a
specific way by Article 79 as “information communicated by a
witness during questioning conducted in the course of the pretrial
process in the criminal case or in court in accordance with the
requirements of Articles 187-191.” These cited articles govern
procedures for questioning of witnesses by the criminal
investigator during the preliminary investigation. None of them
foresee the participation of the defense.40
The quasi-judicial screening and verification functions the
investigator performs are emphasized in the Code‟s provisions on
“verification of evidence.”
These provisions require the
investigator not only to collect but also to verify whatever
information is obtained. This presumably is what turns the
Art. 190(2) provides that the official record must indicate questions that “were
excluded by the investigator,” presumably questions submitted by defense
counsel. However, as noted, infra, defense counsel may not be present or
otherwise participate in the interrogation absent the investigator‟s consent.
Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings 295 (2005).
40
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information into “admissible evidence.” According to Article 87,
verification is performed “by comparing it to other evidence
available in the criminal case file and also by identifying its source
and obtaining other evidence that corroborates or contradicts the
evidence being reviewed.” Based on the foregoing, witness
statements – having been “verified” and converted into “evidence”
by the criminal investigator during the preliminary investigation –
would seem to be sufficient alone to convict the defendant at trial.
At least under circumstances in which such evidence is the
main basis for a conviction, such a practice would seem to violate
Art. 6 § 3(d) because this testimony may be used to convict the
defendant without the opportunity for the defendant to confront the
witness. This violation is discussed in more detail below.
Such a presumption also violates Article 6 § 2. When the
products of the non-adversarial investigation – by reason of their
having been processed by the investigator – can be used at trial as
evidence of guilt, that “investigation” process becomes more than
just a vehicle for finding out information. It serves an “early trial”
function by transforming the information compiled in the case file
into “pre-admitted” evidence ready for use at trial. In other words,
because of the continuing privileges accorded by law to the
investigator (remnants of the presumption of objectivity and
neutrality accorded the investigator under inquisitorial principles
now ostensibly foresworn by the Russian Constitution and Code of
Criminal Procedure, as noted below), the evidence is presumed to
be authenticated (“verified”), a judicial function assumed by a
party in the proceedings. No such legal presumption is accorded to
evidence obtained by the defense, rendering its evidence, in
Bulgakov‟s famous words, “of the second freshness.”41
41

MIKHAIL BULGAKOV, THE MASTER AND MARGARITA 222 (Mirra Ginsburg,
Trans. 1967) (“„They sent us sturgeon of the second freshness,‟ said the bar
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D. ARTICLE 6 § 3 – THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY OF ARMS
1. Relevant Russian Law and Practice

The Constitution of the Russian Federation states, in relevant
part:
Article 123 § 3
Judicial proceedings shall be conducted based on
adversarial principles and equality of the parties.
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
the Russian Federation are as follows:
Article 15
1. Judicial proceedings in criminal cases shall be
conducted in accordance with adversarial principles.
2. The functions of prosecution, defense, and
adjudication of a criminal case shall be separate
from each other and those functions may not be
allocated to any single agency or official.
3. A court is not an organ of criminal prosecution
and shall not take the prosecution or defense side in
a case. The court shall create the conditions
necessary for the parties to perform their procedural
duties and to exercise the rights granted to them.
4. The prosecution and the defense shall have equal
rights before the court.

manager. 'My good man, that‟s nonsense!' 'What‟s nonsense?' 'Second freshness
– that's nonsense! There is only one kind of freshness – first. And that‟s the last,
too. And if the sturgeon is of the second freshness, that means it is rancid.'”)?
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Article 53 § 1(2)
From the time when defense counsel is permitted to
participate in a criminal case, he has the right … to
gather and present such evidence as is necessary to
provide legal representation, in accordance with the
procedures specified in Article 86(3) of this Code;
Article 24042
1. All evidence in the trial of a criminal case shall
be subjected to first-hand examination, except as
specified in Section X of this Code. The court must
hear the testimony of the defendant, the victim and
witnesses, and opinions of any expert, must inspect
the physical evidence, must read aloud official
records and other documents, and must conduct
other judicial actions to examine the evidence.
2.
Testimony given during the preliminary
investigation may be read aloud only in the
situations specified in Articles 276 and 281 of this
Code.
3. A court judgment may be based solely on the
evidence examined at the trial.
Article 281
1. Reading testimony aloud that was previously
given by a victim or witness during the preliminary
investigation or at trial, showing photographic
negatives and prints or slides made in the course of
the questioning or playing back audio and/or video
42

A fourth section to this article was introduced by Federal Law № 39-FZ of 20
March 2011 (after the conclusion of the defendants‟ trial).
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recordings or showing film of the questioning is
allowed, with the consent of the parties, in the event
of the victim‟s or witness‟ failure to appear in court,
with the exception of the situations specified in part
two of this Article.
2. In the event of the victim‟s or witness‟s failure to
appear for trial and on motion of a party or on its
own initiative, the court makes a decision to read
their previous testimony aloud in cases when there
is a:
1) death of the victim or witness;
2) severe illness precluding appearance in court;
3) refusal of the foreign national victim or
witness to appear pursuant to a court subpoena;
4) natural disaster or other exceptional circumstances precluding the appearance in court.
3. On motion of a party, the court may make a
decision to read testimony aloud that was
previously given by a victim or witness during the
preliminary investigation or at trial, if there are
substantial contradictions between the testimony
given previously and the one given in court.
4. The refusal of a witness or victim to testify in
court shall not preclude the reading of his
preliminary investigation testimony aloud, if the
testimony was obtained in accord with the
requirements of Article 11(2) of this Code.
5. Showing negatives and photographs, or slides
made in the course of questioning, playing back
audio and/or video recordings or showing film of
the questioning shall not be permitted without first
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reading aloud the testimony included in the
appropriate official record of the questioning or the
official record of the trial.
Article 285
1. Official records of investigative actions, an
expert‟s opinion given in the course of a
preliminary investigation, as well as other
documents included in the criminal case file or
presented at a trial may be read aloud in full or in
part, pursuant to a ruling or order of the court, if
they set forth or certify circumstances that are
relevant to the criminal case.
2. Official records of investigative actions, an
expert‟s opinion, and other documents shall be read
aloud by the party who requested such reading or by
the court.
2. Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law
Article 6 § 3 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights: … (d) to examine or
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
“While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does
not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such,
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which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national
law.” Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97 (12 May
2000), at ¶ 34 (internal citations omitted). The Court has
emphasized its distinct role, which is not “to determine, as a matter
of principle, whether particular types of evidence – for example,
unlawfully obtained evidence – may be admissible or, indeed,
whether the applicant was guilty or not,” but rather “whether the
proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence
was obtained, were fair.” Id. By this is meant the observance of
the obligation to ensure the right to a fair trial undertaken by the
member states to the Convention. In light of that distinction, “[t]he
Court may overlook minor infringements provided that overall the
proceedings were fair and, conversely, unfairness may still arise
even though the relevant formal requirements may have been
complied with.” Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European
Court of Human Rights 253 (2d ed. 2005).
Although neither of the phrases “adversarial principles” nor
“equality of arms” appears in the Convention, both terms have
been held to be incorporated into the right to a fair hearing
protected by Article 6. See Nuala Mole & Catharina Harby, The
Right to a Fair Trial: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights 46 (2006); Clare Ovey
& Robin C. A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights
176 (2006). The language of Article 6 § 3 reflects the fact that,
although civil-law and common-law countries are both represented
in the member states party to the Convention, their approaches to
criminal justice are not the same. Russian criminal procedure has
drawn from both approaches, although it has been more heavily
influenced by the former, civil-law tradition. Whether to adopt
common law or continental approaches to the admissibility of
evidence has repeatedly been held to be a matter of discretion of
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national law. See, e.g., Schenk v. Switzerland, App. No. 10862/84
(12 July 1988), at ¶ 46; Windisch v. Austria, App. No. 12489/86
(27 September 1990), at ¶ 25.
The European Court has interpreted the right to adversarial
proceedings primarily as “the opportunity to have knowledge of
and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced
by the other party.” Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom, App. No.
28901/95 (16 Feb. 2000) at ¶ 60. This does not necessarily
translate into a right to confront live witnesses at trial. Indeed,
were it otherwise, such a conclusion would render a court‟s
reliance on the case file (delo) a per se violation. Delta v. France,
App. No. 11444/85 (19 Dec. 1990), at ¶ 36. The use at trial of
witness statements obtained during the preliminary investigation
will not contravene either § 1 or § 3(d) of Article 6 of the
Convention “provided the rights of the defence have been
respected.” Id. In the Court‟s words, “[a]s a rule, these rights
require that an accused should be given an adequate and proper
opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either
at the time the witness makes his statement or at some later stage
of the proceedings.” Id. Similarly, the Strasbourg Court has
interpreted equality of arms to require that “each party must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under
conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis his
opponent.” Bulut v. Austria, App. No. 59/1994/506/588 (22 Feb.
1996), at ¶ 47.
Among the first cases before the European Court on this right
to confrontation in adversarial proceedings was Unterpertinger v.
Austria, App. No. 9120/80 (24 Nov. 1986) at ¶ 33.43 The applicant
43

A contemporaneous case, Asch v. Austria, reached the conclusion on similar
facts that no violation occurred. Professor Trechsel has described this judgment
as “an exceptionally weak point in the Court‟s jurisprudence” that “must be
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was convicted of assaulting two family members who gave
statements to the police but refused to testify. Under the relevant
domestic law, the applicant had no opportunity to confront them,
although their statements were read out in court. The Court
unanimously found a violation of Article 6. The rule established
by the Court is:
If the defendant has been given an adequate and
proper opportunity to challenge the depositions,
either when made or at a later stage, their admission
in evidence will not in itself contravene Article 6 §§
1 and 3 (d). The corollary of that, however, is that
where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive
degree on depositions that have been made by a
person whom the accused has had no opportunity to
examine or to have examined, whether during the
investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence
are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with
the guarantees provided by Article 6.
Luca v. Italy, App. No. 33354/96 (27 Feb. 2001), at ¶ 40
(citations omitted). In short, a conviction based “either solely or to
a decisive extent” on testimony that the defense is not given the
opportunity to confront violates the Convention, a conclusion that
the Court has reiterated many times. See, e.g., A.M. v. Italy, App.
No. 37019/97 (14 Dec. 1999) at ¶ 25; P.S. v. Germany, App. No.
33900/96 (20 Dec. 2001), at ¶ 24; Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United
Kingdom, App. Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06 (20 Jan. 2009), at ¶¶

regarded as an unfortunate mistake.”
Criminal Proceedings 295 (2005).

Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in
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34-36.44 As Judge Trechsel has observed, “For the domestic
courts, the lesson is simple enough: the judgment should not refer
to the untested statement. … If the remaining evidence is
insufficient, it will have to acquit.” Stefan Trechsel, Human
Rights in Criminal Proceedings 298 (2005).45
One of the Court‟s most recent judgments against Russia, the
Ilyadi case, highlights this problem. Yuriy Ilyadi was convicted of
selling a forged promissory note. The primary evidence against
him was the testimony of a Captain P., who testified that he was a
Russian law enforcement officer who posed as the purchaser of the
note. Captain P.‟s testimony took the form of a written record of
an interview given to an investigator during the pre-trial
investigation. Captain P. did not appear at trial; rather, the pre-trial
statement was read out in his absence. The defense did not object
to the reading of this record, although Ilyadi later grew suspicious
enough of P.‟s absence to engage in independent efforts to obtain
information about Captain P.‟s whereabouts or even his existence,
which were rebuffed. The failure of P. to testify in person was the
basis for Ilyadi‟s appeal, which the court summarily rejected.
The European Court found a violation of the general
requirement of fairness found in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court specifically noted that “the applicant did not have an
opportunity to examine or to have examined Captain P. at any
stage of the proceedings. During the investigation, the investigator
took down Captain P.‟s statement but did not arrange for a
44

This judgment has been referred to the Grand Chamber, before which a
hearing was held on 19 May 2010. Its judgment remained pending at the time
this report was submitted.
45
Judge Trechsel notes, as a general matter, that there is “a tendency of
increasingly allowing courts to rely on the file rather than live evidence. It is my
view that this is not compatible with the spirit of the various international
human-rights instruments and, more particularly, with the case-law of the
Court.” Id. at 306.
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confrontation between him and the applicant.” Ilyadi v. Russia,
App. No. 6642/05 (5 May 2011), at ¶ 41. Because the evidence
leading to concrete suspicions about Captain P.‟s existence was not
finally obtained by the defense until after Ilyadi‟s conviction, the
Court found a violation of Article 6 in the appellate court‟s failure
to give “a sufficiently specific and explicit reply” to Ilyadi‟s appeal
on this point.
This case illustrates the potential for a confrontation issue to
present both a violation of the general fairness guarantees of
Article 6 § 1 and the right to equality of arms guaranteed by
Article 6 § 3.
It should be noted that in at least one Russian case before the
Strasbourg Court, defense counsel‟s willingness to begin a judicial
proceeding in the absence of a witness whose testimony was then
read from the case file, and subsequent failure to object to
concluding the proceeding despite the witness‟s continued absence,
was deemed to constitute waiver of the defendant‟s right to
confront a live witness. Andandonskiy v. Russia, App. No.
24015/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 Sept. 2006), at ¶ 54. The Court
concluded that there was no violation of Article 6 of the
Convention. It is not possible to determine from the materials
provided and in the time allotted whether such a waiver would
apply to this case.
3. Analysis
In the present case, the use of numerous witness statements
found only in the case file, if not subject to confrontation by the
defendants, likely violates the Convention, even though under
Russian law they are considered to be admissible evidence by
virtue of the privileged position of the investigator in control of the
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case file. Thus, the Khamovnichesky Court relies in its verdict on
the following:
(a) Testimony of Douglas Miller
Douglas Miller, an employee of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, was
described by the court as “the main auditor” of the company for the
consolidated financial reporting of OAO NK Yukos.
His
testimony is described as “read out in the course of the court
hearing pursuant to Article 281” on pages 136, 184, 185, 345, 347,
464, 545-572, 563, 565, 573, 580-582, and 601 of the verdict.46
This testimony was also used by the court to reject the testimony of
another PriceWaterhouseCoopers witness, Stephen Wilson (see
Verdict, p. 624-25) and the testimony of the defendants (see p. 668
& 669). Documentary evidence was also obtained during Miller‟s
examination (see p. 599).
In its objections to a motion filed by the prosecution on 11
December 2009, the defense averred that Miller was a “principal
prosecution witness,” as evidenced by his frequent mention (56
times according to the defense) in the indictment. According to the
same defense document, the investigator denied a request by the
defense to conduct a confrontation between Khodorkovsky and
Miller. This document further asserted that four interrogations of
this witness were omitted from the case file in the defendants‟
case, notwithstanding their relevance.47
46

On page 441, the court refers to the “testimony of the auditor Douglas Miller,”
and, on page 597, the court refers to “testimony by witness D.R. Miller,”
suggesting that Miller appeared in open court to give evidence. Likewise, at
page 614, the court refers to “the evidence produced during court hearing (vol.
132 c.f.s. 20-24) by witness D.R. Miller.” As noted in the text accompanying
footnote 38, infra, this does not appear to have been the case.
47
It is difficult to assess this document, obtained on the website recommended
by the Council, because it is not linked to any response by the Khamovnichesky
court. According to a press release by the defendants, the court denied the
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According to a press release by the defendants, “Before Miller
left Russia, he was interrogated no less than four times by
prosecution investigators between May 2007 and January 2008
without Khodorkovsky, Lebedev or their defense lawyers being
informed and without any opportunity to question Miller or to
attend the interrogations. Subsequently, the prosecution
unjustifiably rejected Khodorkovsky's request to confront Miller
through a Russian procedure whereby a defendant agrees to answer
questions put to both the defendant and the witness.”48
(b) Testimony of Alla Karaseva
Alla Karaseva was described by the court variously as an
employee of JV RTT, OOO Yukos Invest, OOO YuFK, Director
General of OOO Forest oil, OOO Virtus, and OOO Grace. Her
testimony is referenced as “given by her in the course of the pretrial investigation and read out in the court hearing pursuant to
Article 281” on pages 173-175, 321-323 of the verdict. In
addition, the court references inculpatory statements about the
defendants made in the verdict of the Basmanny District Court of
the City of Moscow, which found Ms. Karaseva guilty of fraud and
tax evasion (see p. 323).49
prosecution‟s motion.
See Courtroom update: December 11, 2009,
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Communications Center, 14 December 2009,
http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/content/courtroom-report-december-112009. The verdict of the Khamovnichesky court does not appear to distinguish
any transcripts obtained through the defense team‟s efforts.
48
See Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev Defense Team Seeks
Testimony, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Communications Center, 14 December
2009,
http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/news-resources/stories/mikhailkhodorkovsky-and-platon-lebedev-defense-team-seeks-testimony.
49
Similarly, although V.G. Malakhovsky, whom the court found to be a member
of the organized criminal group, was examined in court (see p. 261), the verdict
references a wide variety of court records of Malakhovsky‟s criminal case
before the the Basmanny District Court of the city of Moscow for various
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According to a press release by the defendants, the court
indicated receipt of a letter from Ms. Karaseva stating that she
could not attend the trial due to medical reasons. The court then
admitted the transcripts of her pre-trial examination over the
objections of the defense, who averred no opportunity to confront
the witness, whose interrogation occurred as part of a different
case after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in the
defendants‟ case.50
(c) Testimony of N. N. Logachev
N.N. Logachev is described by the court as the Director
General and Manager of OAO Tomskneft VNK. This testimony is
referenced as “given during preliminary investigation … and read
out in court session in accordance with Article 281” on pages 288289, and 621 of the verdict. This testimony was also used by the
court to reject the testimony given by defence witnesses T.R.
Gilmanov and P.A. Anisimov, who are described as former
executives of OAO Yuganskneftegas and OAO Samaraneftegas
(see p. 620). This testimony was also used to reject arguments
made by the defendants (see p. 651, 674, 675 (where it is described
only as “testimony”)). This testimony is also used to conclude that
the defendants committed the crimes alleged in the indictment as
part of an organized group, which under the Criminal Code
augmented the punishment (see p. 679).

inculpatory statements (see p. 269, 270, 277, 298, 317, 433, 505, 506, 507, 510,
512, 517), and to reject arguments made by the defence (see p. 630).
50
See Courtroom Report: February 4, 2010, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
Communications
Center,
5
February
2010,
http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/news-resources/stories/courtroom-reportfebruary-4-2010.
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(d) Testimony of N. I. Vlasova
N.I. Vlasova was described by the court as “working in the tax
department of OOO Yukos-Moscow”. Her testimony is referenced
as “made public in the court session in line with Article 281 of the
CCP of the RF, which she gave during the preliminary
investigation,” on pages 355-356 of the verdict. According to a
press release by the defendants, the prosecution indicated receipt of
a letter from Ms. Vlasova in which she declined to attend the court
hearing due to health reasons. The defense did not object to the
transcript of her interrogation, but did note that the transcript came
from a different case, obtained after the preliminary investigation
of the defendants had ended. The prosecution‟s motion to add the
material to the case file was granted.51
(e) Testimony of Antonio Valdes Garcia
Antonio Valdes Garcia is described by the court as a defendant
“in regard to whom the proceedings on the criminal case have been
suspended”. His testimony was relied upon by the court on pages
229-230, 257-258, 317-318, 433-434, 505, and 512 of the verdict.
Valdes Garcia was subsequently found guilty in absentia by the
Basmanny District Court of the City of Moscow on 18 July 2011.52
The court omits mention of the fact that Valdes Garcia suffered
serious physical injuries while in the custody of Russian authorities
in 2005 and fled Russia during his trial in 2007.53
51

See Courtroom Report: February 17, 2010, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
Communications
Center,
18
February
2010,
http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/news-resources/stories/courtroom-reportfebruary-17-2010.
52
See Spanish citizen pronounced a new guilty party in YUKOS case, ITARTASS, 19 July 2011, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c142/188420_print.html.
53
See Ekaterina Zapodinskaya, Khodorkovsky Accomplice Makes a Break,
Kommersant”,
16
January
2007,
www.kommersant.com/p734216/r_1/Antonio?Valdez-Garcia_YUKOS/.
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(f) Other Witness Testimony
In addition to these witnesses, the Khamovnichesky court read
out from the case file the written testimony of a number of other
important witnesses. For example, the testimony of A.A. Shavrin
and O.K. Yegorova, lawyers with the firm ALM Feldmans, was
read from the 2006 court records of the Basmanny District Court in
the criminal case against Valdes Garcia, Malakhovsky, and
Pereverzin. See Verdict, pages 270 and 510-511.
Similarly, the court refers to “the evidence produced by witness
S.I. Vorobyeva, given during court hearing at the Basmanny
District Court” in the same case. See Verdict, page 506. The court
refers to “evidence produced by witness E.V. Agranovskaya” in
the same way. See Verdict, page 507-508.
The Khamovnichesky court‟s verdict records that “[r]ead out
during court hearing was the testimony produced by the P.P. Ivlev,
a Deputy Managing Partner of ALM Feldmans,” but does not refer
to any source from which this testimony was obtained. See
Verdict, page 508.
Citing Article 281, the Khamovnichesky court also “read out at
the court session” the testimony given during the pre-trial
investigation by witness N. M. Petrosian. See Verdict, pages 466467, 508-509, 512-513.
***
In its many references to Article 281, the verdict never
identifies which of the four relevant circumstances envisioned by
that article the court intends to support its use of testimony from
persons who did not appear at trial. In the case of Antonio Valdes
Garcia, for example, it may be that the court concluded that § 2(3)
of Article 281 applied: Valdes Garcia is a foreign national who
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was called as a witness, or perhaps ordered to appear pursuant to a
court subpoena. On the other hand, § 2(4) of that article may have
been applied. Under an interpretation of the Russian Supreme
Court, the need of a witness to travel a long distance was accepted
as an “exceptional circumstance[] precluding the appearance in
court” of the witness and therefore permitting the use of his
previously obtained written testimony under § 2(4) of Article 281.
See Opredelenie ot 10.11.06. Sudebnaya kollegiya po ugolovnym
delam,
kassatsiya
(Dokladchik:
Yakovlev
Vyacheslav
Ksenofontovich) (“With account for the remoteness of the location
of the witnesses and the adoption of all possible means to transport
them, the court found exceptional circumstances prevented their
appearance in court, which in accordance with paragraph 4 of part
2 of Article 281 UPK RF is the foundation for the reading out of
their testimony by motion of the prosecution.”).
The
Khamovnichesky court does not indicate – neither for Valdes
Garcia nor for any other witness – the specific reason it invokes
that article.
Sometimes, the verdict references testimony read out pursuant
to Article 281, when the only possible basis could be found in § 3
of that article: by the motion of a party on the grounds of
substantial contradictions between the testimony given previously
and the one given in court. Thus, the verdict references “the
testimony of witness A.D. Golubovich examined at the court
session, as well as from the records of 09.04.2008 and 05.05.2008
of him being examined as a witness during the pre-trial
investigation read out at the court session under Article 281 of the
RF Code of Criminal Procedure” (see p. 402).54 No indication is

54

Sections 2 and 4 would not seem to apply since the verdict indicates that
Golubovich appeared at the court session as a witness.
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made as to the “substantial contradictions” that would permit this
reading under Russian law.
It is difficult for this report to make categorical conclusions as
to these potential violations on the basis of the verdict alone. It
would appear, however, that the testimony read out from the case
file alone comprises a substantial portion of the evidence used to
convict the defendants. This is especially so given the key nature
of the positions held by the individuals on whose testimony the
verdict relies to establish the defendants‟ guilt. The one-sided use
of this evidence constitutes a violation of equality of arms under
the Convention.
E. ARTICLE 7
1. RELEVANT RUSSIAN LAW AND PRACTICE
The Defendants were convicted, inter alia, of violating Article
160(3)(a) & (b) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, as
amended by Federal Law No. 63-FZ of 13.06.1996, which
provides:
Article 160
1. Misappropriation or Embezzlement is the theft
of another‟s property that has been entrusted to the
perpetrator – * * *
3. Acts, foreseen in the first or second parts of this
article, if they are committed:
(a) by an organized group;
(b) on a large scale;
Theft is defined in the Criminal Code as follows:
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Article 158, Note 1
By theft [хищение] in the articles of the present
Code is understood the self-interested, unlawful,
uncompensated withdrawal and (or) conversion of
someone else‟s property to the benefit of the
perpetrator or other persons, which causes damage
to the owner or other possessor of this property.

The elements of embezzlement were the subject of a decision
of the Plenum of the Supreme Court, “On judicial practice in cases
of fraud, misappropriation and embezzlement,” No. 51 (27
December 2007), the relevant portions of which provide:
1. Courts should pay attention to the fact that,
unlike other forms of theft foreseen in chapter 21 of
the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, fraud
[мошенничество – the crime defined in Article 159
of the Criminal Code] is accomplished by way of
deception or breach of trust, under the influence of
which the owner of the property or another person
or authority conveys the property or the right to it to
other persons or does not impede the withdrawal of
this property or acquisition of rights to it by other
persons. * * *
6. Theft of another‟s property or the acquisition of
the right to it by way of deception or breach of trust,
which is accomplished with the use by this person
of forged official documents that concede a right or
free from responsibility qualifies as an aggregate
crime, as foreseen by part one of Article 327 CC RF
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and the corresponding part of Article 159 CC RF. *
**
8. In the case of the creation of a commercial
enterprise without the intention to actually conduct
business or banking activity, which has the aim of
theft of another‟s property or the acquisition of the
right to it, its commission is completely covered by
fraud [мошенничество]. The given act should
additionally be qualified under Article 173 CC RF
as a false private enterprise only in the case of the
real aggregate of the named crime, when the person
receives something else, which is not connected
with the theft of the property benefit (e.g. when the
false private enterprise is created by the person not
only for the completion of the theft of another‟s
property, but also with the aim of a tax shelter or
cover for prohibited activity, if as a result of the
given activity, which is not connected to the theft of
another‟s property, there was caused a large-scale
damage to citizens, organizations or the state, as
foreseen in Article 173 CC RF). * * *
18. The wrongful free conversion of property that
has been entrusted to a person to his own advantage
or the advantage of another person, which has
caused damage to the owner or other lawful
possessor of this property, should be qualified by
judges as misappropriation or embezzlement [under
Article 160 of the Criminal Code], provided that the
stolen property was in the lawful possession or
authority of this person, who by virtue of his office
or official position, contract or special commission
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exercised power by order, administration, delivery,
use or custody in relation to someone‟s property.
Deciding a question about the outer boundaries of
the make-up of misappropriation or embezzlement
from theft, courts should establish the presence of a
person with the above named powers.
The
accomplishment of a secret theft of another person‟s
property by a person who does not possess such
powers, but who has access to the stolen property
by virtue of the carrying out of his work or other
circumstances, should be qualified under Article
158 CC RF.
19. In the examination of cases about crimes
foreseen in Article 160 CC RF, courts should bear
in mind that misappropriation consists in the
uncompensated, self-interested completion of the
wrongful conversion by a person of property
entrusted to him to his benefit against the will of the
owner.
The crime of misappropriation is considered to be
completed from the moment when the lawful
possession of the property entrusted to the person
becomes wrongful and the person begins to carry
out acts that are directed toward conversion of the
given property to his benefit (e.g., from the moment
when the person by way of forgery hides the
presence with him of the entrusted property, or from
the moment of the non-performance of the person‟s
duty to place monetary resources of this person in
the owner‟s bank account).
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As embezzlement should be qualified wrongful acts
of a person who out of self-interest expends
property entrusted to him against the will of the
owner by use of this property, its expenditure, or
transfer to another person. * * *
20. Deciding the question about the presence in
actions composing a theft in the form of
misappropriation or embezzlement, the court should
establish the circumstances that confirm that the
intent of the person enveloped the wrongful,
uncompensated character of the actions that were
accomplished with the aim to turn the property
entrusted to him to his own benefit or that of
another.
The purposefulness of the intent in each such case
must be determined by a court out of concrete
circumstances of the case, for example, the presence
for a person of the real possibility to return property
to its owner, the completion by him of attempts by
way of forgery, or other ways to hide his actions.
In this, courts must take into account that the partial
reimbursement of damage to the victim by itself is
not evidence of the absence of the person‟s intent
for misappropriation or embezzlement of the
property entrusted to him.
2. RELEVANT ECHR PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW
Article 7 § 1 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:

96

97

CRIMINAL CASE N 1-23/10
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence
on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law at the time when it was
committed.

The protection provided by this article is understood to be “an
essential element of the rule of law, … as is underlined by the fact
that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 (art. 15)
in time of war or other public emergency. It should be construed
and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way
as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecution,
conviction and punishment.” S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No.
47/1994/494/576 (27 Oct. 1995), at ¶ 34.
Article 7 embodies the principle “that the criminal law must
not be extensively construed to an accused‟s detriment, for
instance by analogy”. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88
(25 May 1993), at ¶ 52. The European Court also understands this
right to include the principle that the offence “must be clearly
defined in law.” Id.; see also Moiseyev v. Russia, App. No.
62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009), at ¶ 233. An offence is clearly defined in
law under circumstances “where the individual can know from the
wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the
assistance of the courts‟ interpretation of it, what acts and
omissions will make him criminally liable.” Id.
It follows from these principles that the criminal law must
possess the quality of foreseeability. This means that although the
judicial authority might engage in the case-by-case clarification of
an offence in response to changing social circumstances, the
resulting interpretation must be “consistent with the essence of the
offence and could reasonably be foreseen.” Moiseyev v. Russia,
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App. No. 62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009), at ¶ 234. The European Court
will ask “whether the applicant‟s acts, at the time when they were
committed, constituted criminal offences defined with sufficient
accessibility and foreseeability by Russian or international law.”
Id. at ¶ 235.
The evolution of judicial interpretation of the criminal law has
been found to be reasonably foreseeable when “consistent with the
very essence of the offence” and the conduct in question is
generally “within the scope of the offence.” S.W. v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 47/1994/494/576 (27 Oct. 1995), at ¶ 43. This
exception, however, was made in a case in which only the
existence of an affirmative defense, not the essential elements of
the crime, were in doubt. In that case, the European Court found
no violation of Article 7 in the denial to the applicant of the marital
immunity defense to the charge of raping his wife because the
“essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest” regardless
of the marital relationship and, thus, the conviction of the applicant
could not “be said to be at variance with the object and purpose of
Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention, namely to ensure that no one
should be subjected to arbitrary prosecution, conviction or
punishment”. Id., at ¶ 43-44.
The European Court has found that a criminal law “may still
satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person
concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences
which a given action may entail.” Cantoni v. France, App. No.
45/1995/551/637 (22 Oct. 1996), at ¶ 35. The European Court
noted, in particular, that “persons carrying on a professional
activity” may “be expected to take special care in assessing the
risks that such activity entails.” Id. In that case, however, the
Court noted “one decisive consideration”: the fact that for almost
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thirty years the relevant domestic cassational court “had adopted a
clear position on this matter, which with the passing of time
became even more firmly established.” Id. at ¶ 34.
3. ANALYSIS
The Court convicted Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, as part of an
“organized criminal group,” for the crime of embezzlement under
Article 160 CC RF. Embezzlement is defined in that article as “the
theft of another‟s property that has been entrusted to the
perpetrator.” Theft, in turn, is defined to be “the self-interested,
unlawful, uncompensated withdrawal and (or) conversion of
someone else‟s property to the benefit of the perpetrator or other
persons, which causes damage to the owner or other possessor of
this property.” According to the RF Supreme Court, a conviction
for embezzlement under Article 160 requires the “uncompensated,
self-interested completion of the wrongful conversion by a person
of property entrusted to him to his benefit against the will of the
owner.”
The property Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were convicted of
embezzling was oil. (Verdict, p. 3) The victims of this theft were
three oil-producing companies, OAO Yuganskneftegas, OAO
Samaraneftegas, and OAO Tomskneft VNK. (Verdict, p. 6)
The court‟s description of the defendants‟ modus operandi may
be summarized as follows:
1) The defendants, through OAO NK Yukos, became
majority shareholders in the three oil companies,
which consequently became subsidiaries in Yukos‟s
complex corporate structure under the external
administration of one of Yukos‟s management
companies (Verdict, p. 6, 10);
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2) Having “acquired the right to the strategic
management of OAO NK Yukos,” the defendants
then persuaded the relevant boards of directors and
shareholders of the three oil companies to enter into
contracts for the sale of their oil to Yukos (Verdict,
p. 9). The court found that the defendants had paid
off various participants in these meetings to “secure
the adoption of the indicated unlawful and
groundless decisions” (p. 11);
3) The contracts indicated “that the transfer of the right
of ownership to the output, extracted as part of the
oil-well fluid, from the oil production companies,
appearing in the capacity of the seller, to OAO NK
Yukos, appearing in the capacity of the purchaser,
shall take place at the head of each concrete well
promptly after its extraction from under the
ground.” (Verdict, p. 10)
This theory of the defendants‟ criminal liability under Article
160 was unforeseeable, and thus a violation of Article 7 of the
Convention. First, the theory is premised on the omission or
admitted non-existence of the traditional elements of the crime:
1) The element of “another’s property.” As noted,
the defendants, through Yukos, were alleged to
have obtained by a series of contracts “the transfer
of the right of ownership” to the oil companies‟
production.
A person cannot embezzle from
himself. In order to satisfy this element, i.e. to
show that the oil belonged to someone other than
the defendants, the verdict concludes that although
“the oil passed on into de facto ownership of OAO
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NK Yukos; however, it was not the oil owner de
jure. In reality, the oil belonged to its producing
subsidiaries,” i.e. the victims of the embezzlement.
See Verdict, p. 660. The verdict refers to two legal
sources in support of this legal conclusion: the
judgment of 26 May 2004 by the Moscow City
Commercial Court against Yukos, and a decision of
the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, No.
138-O (25 July 2001) mentioned in that judgment.
Neither legal source supports this bifurcated
concept of simultaneous de facto/de jure ownership.
During the 2004 tax proceedings, the Moscow City
Commercial Court rejected the defendant‟s
argument that the victims and other companies were
the true owners of the oil because those
organizations “never acquired any rights of
ownership, use and disposal in respect of oil and oil
products.”55 These are the rights that define
ownership under Article 209 of the Civil Code.
Likewise, the Constitutional Court determination
[«определение»]
nowhere
references
this
distinction. Rather, that determination concerned
whether
a
previously
rendered
ruling
[«постановление»] about tax charges against the
checking accounts of bona fide taxpayers could be
applied to non-bona fide taxpayers.
It could not be said to be foreseeable that a
contract for the sale of oil would be interpreted to

55

This quotation is taken from the extensive citation to that judgment found in
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 (20 Sept.
2011), at ¶ 48.
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establish only de facto ownership of the object of
these completed transactions in the defendants, but
not the de jure ownership that the Khamovnichesky
Court asserts to remain with the oil production
companies.
2) The element of “entrusted to the perpetrator.”
By definition, a person cannot be “entrusted” with a
thing over which he is the owner. The verdict twice
asserts that some contracts were procured in a
manner rendering them void ab initio
[«ничтожен»] under Russian law. See verdict, pp.
90, 648. The court‟s theory seems to be that the
void contracts did not transfer ownership; thus, the
defendants were entrusted with oil that actually
belonged to the victims. Neither of these two
assertions in the verdict is sound.
The first reference is to contracts implicated in
the
money-laundering
charges,
not
the
embezzlement charges, and thus is not relevant.56
The second reference could refer to embezzlement,
although the verdict is unclear. The verdict states
on the preceding page that the defendants are guilty
of embezzlement “by way of execution of numerous
wrongful transactions in violation of Art. 179 of the
Civil Code.”57 See verdict, p. 647. But Article 179
does not state that such contracts are void, only that
56

The Court cites Article 170 of the Civil Code, under which “a fictitious
transaction, that is, a transaction concluded only for form, without the intention
to create legal consequences corresponding to it, shall be void.”
57
A similar conclusion is also stated on page 12, also citing Art. 179. Article
179 of the Criminal Code establishes the crime of coercing a transaction through
violence or blackmail, but the defendants were not charged with that offense.
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they are voidable by a court upon the suit of the
victim
[«может
быть
признана
судом
недействительной по иску потерпевшего»]. If
such a suit was not brought (and there is no mention
of one in these sections of the verdict), one would
now appear to be time-barred.58 The verdict makes
several references to Article 10 of the Civil Code,
but these are equally unavailing.59
By the court‟s own conclusion, therefore,
ownership of the oil was transferred by these
contracts. If indeed ownership was transferred, the
defendants could not have been “entrusted” with the
property of another and this element of the crime

58

Article 181(2) provides that “A suit to deem a contested transaction to be
invalid and concerning the application of the consequences of its invalidity may
be brought within a year from the date of the termination of the coercion or
threat under whose influence the transaction was concluded (Article 179[1]), or
from the date when the plaintiff knew or should have known about other
circumstances which are the grounds for deeming the transaction to be invalid.”
59
The verdict frequently asserts that Article 10 of the Civil Code has been
contravened by the defendants‟ actions. See Verdict, pp. 12, 35, 543, 659, 665.
Article 10 states in relevant part that “The actions of citizens and juridical
persons effectuated exclusively with the intention to cause harm to another
person, and also abuse of right in other forms, shall not be permitted.”
The court‟s legal analysis, when conducted at all, is perfunctory and
inconsistent with the requirements of the Code. Although Article 10 of the Code
states that actions “effectuated exclusively with the intent to cause harm” [in
Russian: « осуществляемые исключительно с намерением причинить вред
другому лицу»] are prohibited, the verdict concludes only that the defendants
“were simultaneously acting with intent to cause harm to another person” (p. 12)
and “acted concurrently with the intent to cause harm to another person in
violation of Article 10” (p. 665) [in both cases «одновременно действовали»]
(the italicization of these adverbs has been added for emphasis). The verdict‟s
conclusion that any intent to cause harm was not exclusive acknowledges that
this limitation has not been met. This limitation would appear to serve a very
important purpose. Without it, virtually any contract would be susceptible to
allegations of improper motive.
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was lacking. If ownership did not transfer because
of the Khamovnichesky Court‟s conclusion, years
after the fact, that the contracts were void under
Article 179, that conclusion would appear to be a
misreading of that provision of the Code, under
which contracts are voidable upon the successful
suit of the victim, but not void by order of the court
sua sponte.
But even were the court to have concluded that
it did have the power to declare these contracts void
under Article 10, a power in no way specified there,
it can hardly be claimed to have been foreseeable
that the oil would then be deemed to have been
entrusted to the defendants, especially given that the
payment rendered under the contracts does not
appear to have been returned.60 The relevant
conduct, an exchange of oil for money, simply
cannot be characterized as an entrustment to one of
the property of another.
3) The element of “theft.” The court states that the
contracts between Yukos and the three oil
companies “obviously contradicted the interests of
the latter” (p. 9), were procured by the defendants‟
misleading statements to the companies‟
shareholders and boards of directors (p. 9), and
were “economically disadvantageous for them right
from the start” (p. 10). Even if true, the court notes
60

Indeed, Article 10(2) states only that a court “may refuse to defend the right
belonging to the person” who acted exclusively with the intention to cause harm
to another, not that such conduct may serve as an element of the crime of
misappropriation. To the contrary, Article 10(3) establishes a legal presumption
of reasonableness and good faith of all participants in civil law relations.
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that each contract established prices that were, in
fact, paid for the oil. It thus cannot be claimed that
the defendants‟ actions amounted to the
“uncompensated withdrawal and (or) conversion of
someone else‟s property to the benefit of the
perpetrator or other persons, which causes damage
to the owner or other possessor of this property.”

The court‟s theory appears to be that, using a variety of sham
companies, the theft was accomplished “by means of the deliberate
underestimation of the prices of oil” owned by the oil companies
(p. 242). The Court describes the defendants‟ “intent to embezzle
someone else‟s property by means of clearly nonequivalent
payment of its value.” (p. 159) The court makes frequent
reference to its conclusion that the contracts “did not involve
exchange for value” (e.g. p. 164, 167). Because the court‟s theory
of liability does not even track the elements of the offense, it
cannot be held that it is “consistent with the essence of the offence
and could reasonably be foreseen” by the defendants. Moiseyev v.
Russia, App. No. 62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009), at ¶ 234. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine a crime more unforeseeable than one that depends
on a court‟s post hoc conclusions that the agreed contract price was
not of quite the right amount.
A second indication that this theory of embezzlement was
unforeseeable is its sharp inconsistency with the decision of the
Supreme Court interpreting these provisions of the Criminal Code.
That decision not only upheld the importance of the elements that
the court disregards but noted that an alternative provision of the
Code was better suited to the court‟s conclusions of fraud. As the
Supreme Court noted in paragraph 6 of its decision, “[t]heft of
another‟s property or the acquisition of the right to it by way of
deception or breach of trust, which is accomplished with the use by
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this person of forged official documents that concede a right or
free from responsibility qualifies as an aggregate crime, as
foreseen by part one of Article 327 CC RF and the corresponding
part of Article 159 CC RF.” The Supreme Court, in paragraph 8,
further explained that,“[i]n the case of the creation of a commercial
enterprise without the intention to actually conduct business or
banking activity, which has the aim of theft of another‟s property
or the acquisition of the right to it, its commission is completely
covered by fraud [мошенничество].”
With regard to
embezzlement, on the other hand, the Supreme Court reiterated the
traditional statutory elements of the crime. See paragraphs 18-20,
Supreme Court decision, supra.
Perhaps the Khamovnichesky Court sought guidance (although
it does not say so) in the Supreme Court‟s decision interpreting
embezzlement, which noted that “the partial reimbursement of
damage to the victim by itself is not evidence of the absence of the
person‟s intent for misappropriation or embezzlement of the
property entrusted to him.” (Para. 20, Supreme Court decision.)
This, however, would be more weight than this short reference
could bear. It cannot be considered a foreseeable interpretation of
either the statute or the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of it to
equate poor business judgment about (or even fraudulently induced
or ill-intentioned agreement to) a contract for the sale and purchase
of oil with a partial reimbursement of damage due to
embezzlement.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that while the
Khamovnichesky court sought such a novel theory under which to
convict the defendants for embezzlement, it eschewed more
straightforward applications of the Criminal Code. The court
frequently characterized the defendants‟ conduct in terms
suggesting criminal liability under a number of provisions in the
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Criminal Code: Article 165 (causing damage to property by fraud
or breach of trust), Article 173 (creating a false business
organization), Article 201 (abuse of authority), Article 204
(commercial bribery), and Article 327 (forgery).61 However, the
defendants were not indicted for these crimes and the court neither
references these articles nor makes any concerted effort to show
that their elements have been satisfied. This may well be due to
the fact that the statute of limitations for these crimes had passed.62
The indictment also did not charge crimes for which the statute of
limitations had not completely passed, e.g. the crimes of theft by
an organized group [кража] under Article 158(3)(a) and fraud
[мошенничество] by an organized group under Article 159(3)(a).
Indeed, the Supreme Court made clear that “[i]n the case of the
creation of a commercial enterprise without the intention to
actually conduct business or banking activity, which has the aim of
61

For example, the Khamovnichesky court states that the contracts with the oil
producing companies “bore a fictitious character, inasmuch as they included
within themselves knowingly false information” about both the price and the
purchaser of the oil (p. 12). The court concludes, “[i]n such a manner, by way
of organizing the signing of the general agreements, M.B. Khodorkovsky, acting
in coordination with P.L. Lebedev, did factually deprive the management of
OAO Samaraneftegas, OAO Yuganskneftegas and OAO Tomskneft VNK of the
opportunity to dispose of the oil produced by these companies on their own.” (p.
13).
62
Under Article 78 CC RF, the statute of limitations for these crimes is six
years, calculated from the date of the offense to the entry into legal force of the
judgment. If, as the court states, the defendants committed a “continuous crime”
(see verdict, pp. 72, 678), this period would be calculated from 2003, the last
alleged act of embezzlement. It should be noted, however, that although an
earlier version of the Criminal Code included “repeatedly” («неоднократно») as
a possible element of the offense of embezzlement, see Article 160(2)(b) of the
Criminal Code in its 7 July 2003 edition, the current Code omits any mention of
this quality of the offense, and the Code itself does not provide for the concept
of a continuing violation. Article 16 of the Criminal Code, which governed the
repeatedness of crimes («неоднократность преступлений»), was removed
from the Criminal Code on 8 December 2003 by Federal Law 162-FZ.
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theft of another‟s property or the acquisition of the right to it, its
commission is completely covered by fraud.” Nevertheless, no
such charge was made against the defendants and the court makes
no attempt to establish its elements other than to assert, in
conclusory language, that the defendants indeed committed both
theft and fraud.63
A third indication that the application of embezzlement to the
defendants‟ business activities could not have been foreseeable
may be the array of judgments by Russian courts to the contrary.
This section of the verdict is difficult to assess. According to the
verdict, the defendants identified sixty-one judgments of the RF
arbitration courts (p. 660). Only two judgments are cited with
particularity, both apparently including statements about oil owned
by Yukos.
In addition to typographical errors in the
Khamovnichesky court‟s references to them,64 it is impossible to
know from the court‟s description whether the ownership in
question refers to the contracts that are the basis of the charges
against the defendants. In any event, the Khamovnichesky court‟s
verdict summarily dismisses the bulk of these unspecified
judgments with the following conclusion:

63

The court similarly asserts that the defendants‟ actions variously violated
Article 1 of the RF Civil Code (p. 4), Article 10 of the RF Civil Code (p. 12),
Article 83 para 3 of Federal Law No. 308-FZ On Joint-Stock Companies of 26
December 1995 (as amended by Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 13 June 1996) (p.
10), and Article 6 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Law of the RSFSR No. 948-1, “On
Competition and the Restriction of Monopolistic Activity on Commodities
Markets” of 22.03.91 (as amended by Federal Law No. 83-FZ of 25 May 1995)
(p. 11). The language of these statutes is not quoted, and no legal analysis is
provided that applies facts proven in court to the relevant law.
64
The quotations made in the verdict from these commercial court judgments, as
well as the quotation from the Constitutional Court judgment that appears on
page 660 of the verdict, do not use complete quotation marks, making evaluation
of the material referenced difficult.
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Thus, it follows from those commercial court
judgments that the oil passed on into de facto
ownership of OAO NK Yukos; however, it was not
the oil owner de jure. In reality, the oil belonged to
its producing subsidiaries. In such circumstances,
the court concludes that the commercial court
judgments do not refute and do not affect in any
way the establishment of the circumstances of
commission of crimes in this case or the court‟s
conclusions regarding the defendants‟ guilt and
classification of their actions. (p. 660)

The Khamovnichesky court also distinguishes these judgments
by asserting that “As of the moment of issuance of the judgments
mentioned by M.B. Khodorkovsky, the courts did not know the
mechanism of theft of oil of OAO NK Yukos‟s oil-producing
enterprises developed by M.B. Khodorkovsky, P.L. Lebedev, and
other organized group participants.” (p. 660-61) It is impossible
to assess the validity of this assertion, however, without evaluating
the arbitration court judgments in question. Such an evaluation, if
completed, might further bolster the evidence of a violation of
Article 7 in these proceedings.
VI. OTHER POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS
Per the instructions communicated by the Council, this report
focused its analysis on the verdict of the Khamovnichesky District
Court and the official trial documents available via the website that
the Council recommended. On the basis of these documents, and
primarily among these the verdict, it is possible to identify a
number of potential violations of the European Convention on
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Human Rights. Violations of Articles 3, 6, and 7 of the
Convention have been analyzed in detail.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that this report cannot be
taken to provide an exhaustive list of violations arising out of the
proceedings. Because a proper examination of those other
potential violations would require access to additional materials
that have not been made accessible, and/or would require
additional time that was not available, it is beyond the scope of this
report to do more than note their existence in summary form. To
do so should not be taken as a sign of their lesser importance.
Rather, this approach simply reflects the limitations identified
above.
Were resources available to conduct a thorough examination of
the trial proceedings that are not accessible through an analysis of
the verdict, several other articles would raise potential areas of
inquiry. For example, the court‟s decisions concerning the
defendants‟ pre-trial detention raise issues under Article 5, which
provides an array of procedural protections applicable to that stage
of the proceedings but which are not susceptible to evaluation on
the basis of the materials available. Likewise, the right to respect
for private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 may also be
implicated by the treatment of the defendants.
Similarly, Article 4 of Protocol 7 provides that “[n]o one shall
be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he
has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with
the law and penal procedure of that State.” It is beyond the scope
of this report to analyze the facts of the first case in sufficient
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detail to evaluate the possibility of a violation of this provision of
the Convention.65
In addition, several articles of the Convention contain multiple
sub-parts. Thus, Article 6 § 3 (b) guarantees the right to adequate
time and facilities for a defence. Evaluation of a claim that this
right was violated in the defendants‟ trial would require access to
substantially more materials than were available for the completion
of this report.
In addition to these core rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Convention, other articles of the Convention raise issues that are
worth noting in conclusion.
A. ARTICLE 18
Article 18 of the Convention provides:
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to
the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for
any purpose other than those for which they have
been prescribed.
The European Court has noted more than once that Article 18
“does not have an autonomous role. It can only be applied in
conjunction with other Articles of the Convention.” Gusinskiy v.
Russia, App. No. 70276/01, at ¶ 73. That case concerned the
65

Such a violation might be considered to manifest itself in “attaching a
different legal qualification to the same facts rather than prosecuting the accused
for a different set of facts.”
Rapporteur Mrs. Sabine LeutheusserSchnarrenberger, Allegations of politically motivated abuses of the criminal
justice system in Council of Europe member states, Report to the Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, Doc. 11993 (7 Aug. 2009), at ¶ 105.
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detention of the owner of ZAO Media Most (the holding company
for the Russian television channel NTV) at least in part to compel
the transfer of his company to a state-controlled company. Id. at
¶¶ 75-76. Perhaps because the violation in that case was so
blatant, and because the Russian Government did not dispute the
central facts around which the violation centered (the detention of
the applicant in order to coerce the sale of his company to the
state),66 the Court‟s description of the elements of a successful
complaint under Article 18 were spare: “when considering the
allegation under Article 18 of the Convention the Court must
ascertain whether the detention was also, and hence contrary to
Article 18, applied for any other purpose than that provided for in
Article 5 § 1 (c).” Id. at ¶ 74.
This bare description deceptively suggests a low threshold to
find a violation. In prior applications to the European Court, the
defendants and other parties associated with the defendants have
asserted claims under Article 18. See Aleksanyan v. Russia, App.
No. 46468/06 (22 Dec. 2008) at ¶¶ 219-220; Khodorkovskiy v.
Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31 May 2011) at ¶¶ 249-261; OAO
Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 (20
Sept. 2011) at ¶¶ 663-666. These claims all failed to attract the
support of a majority on the Court. In the first judgment, the Court
concluded that although the complaint under Article 18 should be
declared admissible, the disposition of the claims to which it was
66

See id. at ¶ 75 (“The Government did not dispute that the July agreement, in
particular Annex 6 to it, linked the termination of the Russian Video
investigation with the sale of the applicant's media to Gazprom, a company
controlled by the State. The Government did not dispute either that Annex 6 was
signed by the Acting Minister for Press and Mass Communications. Lastly, the
Government did not deny that one of the reasons for which Mr Nikolayev closed
the proceedings against the applicant on 26 July 2000 was that the applicant had
compensated for the harm caused by the alleged fraud by transferring Media
Most shares to a company controlled by the State.”).
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connected rendered its separate examination unnecessary. See
Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 46468/06 (22 Dec. 2008) at ¶ 220.
In Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, on the other hand, the Court made
a determination on the merits. The Court noted widespread
suspicion of the motives of the Russian Government in prosecuting
the defendants found in the resolutions of a variety of public and
private institutions. Included among these, and described as
“probably the strongest argument in favour of the applicant‟s
complaint under Article 18,” were the findings of a number of
European Courts in cases concerning the Yukos oil company and
its leadership. Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31
May 2011) at ¶ 260. Nevertheless, the Court found no breach of
Article 18.
In so doing, the Court set a high bar for complaints under
Article 18. First, the Court articulated a rebuttable presumption of
good faith for all government action. This translated into a
requirement that the applicant “must convincingly show that the
real aim of the authorities was not the same as that proclaimed (or
as can be reasonably inferred from the context).” Id. at ¶ 255.
Second, the Court stated that it would apply “a very exacting
standard of proof” and that the burden of proof would remain with
the applicant, notwithstanding the establishment of a prima facie
case of improper motive. Id. at ¶ 256. Third, the Court
characterized the applicant‟s claim to be that “the whole legal
machinery of the respondent State in the present case was ab initio
misused, that from the beginning to the end the authorities were
acting with bad faith and in blatant disregard of the Convention.”
Id. at ¶ 260. Such a claim, the Court stated, “requires an
incontrovertible and direct proof.” Id.
This last requirement, of “incontrovertible and direct proof,”
was reiterated in the most recent judgment, Neftyanaya Kompaniya
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Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 (20 Sept. 2011) at ¶ 663. The
Court acknowledged in a generic fashion the “massive public
attention” and comments by “various bodies and individuals”
concerning the proceedings against Yukos. These, however, the
Court found to be of “little evidentiary value.” Id. at ¶ 665. The
Court stated that it could not find (apart from its previous findings
of violations of the Convention earlier in the judgment) “any
further issues or defects in the proceedings … [that] would enable
it [to] conclude that there has been a breach of Article 18 of the
Convention on account of the applicant company‟s claim that the
State had misused those proceedings with a view to destroying the
company and taking control of its assets.” Id. This part of the
judgment was unanimous, perhaps reflecting the Court‟s holding
(also unanimous) that at least some of the tax assessments did not
violate Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention.
In the past, the Court has noted that a violation of Article 18
was theoretically possible even in the absence of a finding of a
free-standing violation of a right protected by the Convention (a
statement omitted from the Court‟s judgment, but found elsewhere,
e.g. Gusinskiy v. Russia, App. No. 70276/01 (19 May 2004) at ¶ 73
(“There may, however, be a violation of Article 18 in connection
with another Article, although there is no violation of that Article
taken alone.”)). These judgments concerning the defendants and
Yukos, however, suggest that the Court is not inclined to find a
violation of Article 18 in association with complaints made under
other articles of the Convention.
B. ARTICLE 34
Article 34 of the Convention states:
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The Court may receive applications from any person,
non-governmental organization or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights
set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder
in any way the effective exercise of this right.

A number of circumstances could give rise to a violation of
Article 34. With regard to his first conviction, Khodorkovsky has
filed two separate applications with the European Court. In his
first application, Khodorkovsky alleged that prison officials had
interfered with his attorney‟s attempt to pass him a blank
application form and other papers for use in perfecting his
application to the Court. See the admissibility decision in
Khodorkovsky v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (7 May 2009), at ¶ 9.
The Court, while holding the application partly admissible,
unanimously held this part of the application inadmissible. Id.
Khodorkovsky appears to have alleged a violation of Article 34
in his second application to the Court, lodged on 16 March 2006,
concerning the first trial. The decision to communicate this
application to the Russian Government was made on 15 November
2007. No decision has yet been announced regarding its
admissibility in whole or in part. The application alleged:
access to the applicant's lawyers was especially
restricted in the period leading up to the expiry of the
six-month deadline for submitting his claim with
regard to violation of his right to a fair trial; the
authorities had refused to implement a Supreme
Court decision allowing the applicant access to
lawyers during working hours; it had not been
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possible to provide a copy of the present application
in draft to the applicant to consider in his own time;
four of the five lawyers instructed by the applicant to
advise him in relation to his ECHR claim had been
hindered in obtaining access to the applicant; and the
applicant's two Russian lawyers, Mr Drel and Ms
Moskalenko, had been subject to intimidatory
actions by the State. Both had been threatened with
disbarment and the International Protection Centre,
which Ms Moskalenko founded, had been subjected
to a tax audit of the entirety of its work.
See Statement of Facts and Questions for the Parties compiled by
the Registry of the Court in Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (No. 2)
(App. No. 11082/06 communicated 3 December 2007) at § G.
Additional information would be needed to determine whether
such an allegation could be made with regard to the second trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is the conclusion of this report that the verdict in this case
evidences the violation of the defendants‟ human rights protected
under Articles 3, 6, and 7 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Other violations of the Convention are possible, including
but not limited to violations of Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 18, 34, and
Article 4 of Protocol 7. However, evaluation of complaints raised
under these parts of the Convention would require access to
additional resources that were not available for this report.

Respectfully submitted,

